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ABSTRACT Stunned by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush
administration adopted a new National Security Strategy in September 2002. The
UK government took a similar stance. This new strategy calls for anticipatory attacks
against potential enemies with uncertain capacities and intentions, even before their
threat is imminent. Rather than wait for evidence of weapons of mass destruction, it
shifts the burden of proof, obliging ‘‘rogue’’ states to show that they do not harbor
weapons of mass destruction or terrorist cells, or else face the possibility of attack. This
new strategy amounts to the adoption of the Precautionary Principle against the risk of
terrorism. We offer two main conclusions about precaution against terrorism. First,
any action taken to reduce a target risk always poses the introduction of countervailing
risks. Moreover, a precautionary approach to terrorism is likely to entail larger, more
expensive interventions, so the expected opportunity costs are likely to be higher. While
considering worst-case scenarios is important for the development of sound policy,
taking action based only on worst-case thinking can introduce unforeseen dangers and
costs. We argue that a better approach to managing risk involves an assessment of the
full portfolio of risks—those reduced by the proposed intervention, as well as those
increased. We argue that decision makers developing counterterrorism measures need
mechanisms to ensure that sensible risk analysis precedes precautionary actions. Such a
mechanism currently exists to review and improve or reject proposed precautionary
measures against health and environmental risks, but not, so far, for counterterrorism
and national security policies. We urge the creation of such a review mechanism.
KEY WORDS: Terrorism, precautionary principle, risk analysis, Iraq, war, regulatory review

Introduction
Terrorism poses a serious risk to health, safety and the environment. Using
conventional methods such as bombs or aircraft, terrorism can cause dozens
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to thousands of human fatalities, spread toxic plumes of smoke, and trigger
widespread fear and restrictions on civil liberties. Using weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)—chemical, biological or nuclear weapons—terrorism
could inflict much greater harm, perhaps millions of deaths and irreparable
ecological devastation. Managing the risk of terrorism has become the
paramount concern of many governments. Yet the sources of terrorism are
highly uncertain, very difficult to assess and manage, and intent on evading
preventive measures.
Governments have many options for managing threats to national security.
After several decades of pursuing deterrence and containment against the
Soviet Union, the US won the Cold War, only to be stunned by the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Concerned that deterrence and containment
would not succeed against non-state actors willing to commit suicide attacks,
and loath to repeat the mistake of 9/11 (perhaps next time with WMD), the
Bush administration adopted a new National Security Strategy in September
2002 (Bush, 2002a). The UK government took a similar stance. This new
strategy calls for anticipatory attacks against potential enemies with uncertain
capacities and intentions, even before their threat is imminent. Rather than
wait for evidence of WMD, it shifts the burden of proof, obliging ‘‘rogue’’
states to show that they do not harbor WMD or terrorist cells, or else face the
possibility of attack. It invites international cooperation but does not oblige
unilateral action to wait for UN authorization.
This new strategy amounts to the adoption of the Precautionary
Principle against the risk of terrorism. The Precautionary Principle is
familiar to students of risk analysis and policy (Raffensperger and Tickner,
1999; Sandin, 1999; Wiener, 2006; Wiener and Rogers, 2002). In various
formulations in numerous international treaties and declarations on health
and environmental risks, the Precautionary Principle holds that uncertainty
is no excuse for inaction against serious or irreversible risks, that absence of
evidence of risk is not evidence of absence of risk, and that rather than
waiting for evidence of harm to be demonstrated before acting, the burden
of proof should be shifted to require sponsors of a risky product or activity
to demonstrate that it is safe or else be subject to regulatory restriction or
ban (for example, Rio declaration on environment and development (1992)
31 I.L.M. 876; Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994; The Science and
Environmental Health Network; Wiener and Rogers, 2002). For example,
the Rio Declaration in 1992 proclaimed:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures
to prevent environmental degradation. (Rio declaration: principle 15 (1992).)

And the European Environment Agency advised in January 2002:
Forestalling disasters usually requires acting before there is strong proof of
harm (European Environment Agency, 2002).
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Although the US government has often criticized the Precautionary Principle
when applied to risks such as beef hormones, genetically modified foods and
climate change, the Bush administration has made precisely the precautionary case for its decisions to undertake anticipatory counterterrorism
measures, from domestic security to detaining prisoners to the use of military
force in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. The new National Security Strategy
states:
We cannot let our enemies strike first … [but must take] anticipatory action to
defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the
enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the
United States, will, if necessary, act preemptively. … America will act against
such emerging threats before they are fully formed. … The greater the threat,
the greater is the risk of inaction and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the
time and place of the enemy’s attack (Bush, 2002a).

Similarly, in justifying the war in Iraq, the UK government highlighted the
threat of surprise attack with WMD, famously mentioning that Iraqi forces
could deploy WMD within 45 minutes (Butler et al., 2004).
National-security analysts tend to use their own specialized language to
describe strategies for managing risk. They use terms such as deterrence, preemption and prevention, while analysts assessing threats to the environment
use terms such as control, prevention and precaution. But a strategy of
prevention with regard to national security is precisely analogous to a
strategy of precaution with regard to threats to health and environment. The
political right tends to favor a precautionary approach in national-security
affairs, while the left tends to oppose it; whereas in the areas of health and
environment, the politics are reversed: the left tends to favor precaution,
while the right opposes it. Perhaps for this reason, the argument we make in
this paper is likely to make all sides uncomfortable.
The application of the Precautionary Principle to counterterrorism is
important for us to study because it helps to lay bare some of the pros and
cons of the principle, irrespective of the type of hazard or political
orientation, and thereby move toward a more moderate, less ideological
approach that considers consequences rather than labels. Instead of those on
the political left categorically favoring precaution in the health and
environmental arena but opposing it in the national security arena, and
those on the political right taking the opposite categorical view, each side
should see that the merits of precaution depend on the consequences of each
proposed action rather than the categorical label. The left should see the
potential drawbacks of precaution against health and environmental risks,
and the potential case for precaution against terrorism; and the right should
see the potential drawbacks of precaution in the Iraq war, and the potential
case for precaution in the health and environmental arena. Assessing the
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application of precaution across the political spectrum can foster a more
open-minded and merits-based evaluation of specific policies.
This paper draws on the tools and lessons of risk analysis to analyze the
new national security strategy as a strategy of precaution. First, we show the
close relationship between the new strategy and the Precautionary Principle.
Second, we compare the distinction between ‘‘preemptive’’ war and
‘‘preventive’’ war to the similar but differently labeled distinction in risk
regulation. Third, we examine the reasons for the shift to the precautionary
strategy, including strategic needs, risk assessments via intelligence estimates
of WMD held by rogue states or terrorists, and the psychology of availability
and dread. Finally, we explore how risk analysis can help evaluate
counterterrorism measures by developing a framework for a full portfolio
analysis of the multiple consequences of precaution against terrorism and its
alternatives. The choice to take precautionary action confronts conflicting
potential errors. Not acting may neglect a real risk (i.e., a false negative).
Acting may prove unnecessary or misguided if the risk was unfounded or its
true cause was elsewhere (i.e., a false positive). In general, policies designed
to reduce the probability of false negatives, such as a potentially catastrophic
surprise attack, increase the probability of false positives, such as a needless
war with attendant loss of life. Moreover, precautionary action may induce
new countervailing risks (or yield ancillary benefits) (Wiener and Rogers,
2002). At the same time, we observe that the case of counterterrorism can
provide a lesson for risk analysts: the need to anticipate and address
subsequent strategic moves taken by terrorists to evade initial counterterrorism measures. In the last part, we argue that the shift of national
security strategy to precaution requires a new institutional mechanism to
undertake the systematic application of full portfolio risk analysis to
proposed counterterrorism measures. Consistent with the longstanding
system of review of health and environmental measures, we propose the
creation of an institutional mechanism for full portfolio analysis of
counterterrorism measures via expert review in a White House office (and
in a counterpart office in other national governments or the UN Security
Council).
We offer two main conclusions about precaution against terrorism. First,
it is best to be precautionary about the Precautionary Principle. A
precautionary approach to terrorism is likely to entail larger, more expensive
interventions, so the expected opportunity costs are likely to be higher.
Moreover, any action taken to reduce a target risk always poses the
introduction of countervailing risks. While considering worst-case scenarios
is important for the development of sound policy, taking action based only
on worst-case thinking can introduce unforeseen dangers and costs
(Cirincione et al., 2004). We argue that a better approach to managing
risk involves an assessment of the full portfolio of risks—those reduced by
the proposed intervention, as well as those increased.
Second, decision makers developing counterterrorism measures (including the US government, other national governments, and the UN Security
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Council) need mechanisms to ensure that sensible risk analysis precedes
precautionary actions. Our own analysis of the consequences of precaution
against terrorism indicates that ex ante analyses have been seriously
incomplete. Such a mechanism currently exists to review and improve or
reject proposed precautionary measures against health and environmental
risks, as seen in the White House review of regulatory impact analyses,
addressing benefits and costs, required by Presidential Executive Order (and
similar functions in other countries). However, such a mechanism appears to
be absent or underdeveloped for counterterrorism and national security
policies. We urge the creation of such a review mechanism.
The Strategic Shift to Precaution
In general, the degree of precaution can be measured in terms of timing and
stringency. The sooner such measures are adopted (anticipating earlier, but
with greater uncertainty, the future manifestation of the risk), and the more
stringently they attempt to control the risk, the more ‘‘precautionary’’ such
measures are (Wiener and Rogers, 2002).
The Precautionary Principle takes several forms (Wiener and Rogers,
2002; Sandin, 1999), with a basic formulation providing that scientific
uncertainty is no excuse for inaction against serious or irreversible risks (Rio
declaration (1992): Principle 15). The Precautionary Principle is particularly
aimed at overcoming the burden of proving that a risk is real or imminent,
and authorizing protective government action even when the risk is quite
uncertain but could turn out to be very harmful. It is intended to enable and
impel governments to address more risks that may be false negatives
(problems initially but erroneously thought to be absent or small that later
turn out to be real and serious) and to be less hesitant about regulating those
that turn out to be false positives (problems initially but erroneously thought
to be serious that later turn out to be absent or small) (Sanderson and
Peterson, 2001). The Precautionary Principle is especially concerned that
false negatives may be catastrophes, such as global climate change or
widespread toxic pollution, and that waiting for proof will mean waiting
until it is too late to avert catastrophe. Strong versions of the Precautionary
Principle hold that the burden of proof should be shifted so that rather than
the burden falling on governments to show that an activity is unduly risky
before taking policy action, the burden instead falls on those subject to the
policy to show that their activities are not unduly risky.
Parallel Claims of Precaution
Many counterterrorism measures fit squarely into the logic of the
Precautionary Principle. They often intervene in anticipation of possible
but highly uncertain risks of future terrorist acts. Counterterrorism
frequently operates on the basis of incomplete, even sketchy, evidence or
hints of planning by secretive, shadowy groups whose true intentions,
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capacities, members, locations and weaponry are unknown.
Counterterrorism often responds to worst-case scenarios of potential
attackers’ motivations and capabilities. Counterterrorism measures can be
quite stringent, including: incarceration of suspects (sometimes for years
with no charges filed); internment of ethnic minorities feared to harbor
terrorists, e.g., Japanese-Americans during World War Two; surveillance of
private citizens; assassinations of terrorist leaders; destruction of the homes
of terrorists’ relatives; and outright large-scale warfare. Compared to the
precautionary policies adopted to regulate food safety or environmental
pollution (such as product bans and costly regulations), these counterterrorism measures are far more aggressive, against equally or more
uncertain sources of risk, posing roughly equal or even greater prospects
of harm.
The shift to precaution in the new National Security Strategy is not
unprecedented, because the US had taken selective precautionary military
and covert actions in the past, but the wholesale adoption of precautionary
action as the official strategy—coupled with the demonstrated will to launch
precautionary wars to topple foreign governments—is quite striking. The
basic approach favored during the Cold War was containment and
deterrence. Containment, crystallized by George Kennan in a 1947 article
in Foreign Affairs, is a policy of curtailing the spread of the adversary’s
sphere of influence without necessarily attempting to roll it back. Kennan
understood that the Soviet system harbored the seeds of its own destruction,
and that the patient application of counter-pressure against Russia’s
expansionist tendencies, combined with a policy of exploiting tensions
within the Communist world, would be as effective in the long term, and far
less dangerous than outright aggression. Deterrence involves dissuading
unacceptable actions by the adversary by threatening to impose unacceptably high costs in retaliation. The US and NATO strategies during the Cold
War relied heavily on deterrence, at the strategic nuclear level and also on
lower rungs of the escalation ladder, to dissuade Communist countries from
launching conventional attacks into Western Europe or a first strike with
nuclear weapons.
The end of the Cold War and the rise of non-state threats to
international security made deterrence a less effective option. Non-state
actors with no base of operations are harder to deter militarily because it is
unclear whom to threaten with massive retaliation, and where. Suicide
bombers, in particular, cannot be deterred with military means because they
do not fear death. (Still, there may be other things they fear, such as a
damaged reputation or inability to enter heaven, which decision-makers
might try to exploit.) If such terrorists join forces with ‘‘rogue’’ states
equipped with WMD—as the Bush administration feared—the result could
be catastrophic. A better approach for protecting Americans in the twentyfirst century, the Bush administration argued, was preventive war: destroying the adversaries’ weapons even if there is little or no evidence that an
attack is imminent. President George W. Bush put the issue in stark terms:
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‘‘Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the
smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud’’ (Bush,
2002b).
In September 2002, the Bush administration announced a new doctrine
of anticipatory self-defense, which advocated using military force to prevent
potential attacks by rogue states and terrorists. ‘‘We cannot let our enemies
strike first’’, the doctrine said, but must take ‘‘anticipatory action to defend
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s
attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the
United States, will, if necessary, act preemptively. … America will act
against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. … The greater
the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction and the more compelling the case
for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty
remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack’’ (Bush,
2002a).The approach of ‘‘taking anticipatory action’’, before ‘‘threats are
fully formed’’ was justified, the president argued, because waiting for
evidence or proof could result in catastrophe. If the worst possible outcome
were to transpire for example, if terrorists were to detonate a nuclear
weapon or spread a plague, thousands or millions of innocent US civilians
could be killed.
The language used by the Bush administration to justify anticipatory
war, and the war in Iraq in particular, is strikingly similar to language used
by proponents of precaution in other areas. For example, compare the
following two statements, the first by President Bush in 2002, the second by
the EU’s Environment Commissioner Margot Wallstrom, both from 2002.
If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long (Bush,
2002c).
If you smell smoke, you don’t wait until your house is burning down before
you tackle the cause (Wallstrom, 2002).

Likewise nongovernmental advocates of the Precautionary Principle say:
Sometimes if we wait for proof it is too late. … If we always wait for scientific
certainty, people may suffer and die, and damage to the natural world may be
irreversible (SEHN, 2002).

Former US Vice President Al Gore has written regarding global warming:
We need to act now on the basis of what we know. … The insistence on
complete certainty about the full details of global warming—the most serious
threat that we have ever faced—is actually an effort to avoid facing the awful,
uncomfortable truth: that we must act boldly, decisively, comprehensively,
and quickly, even before we know every last detail about the crisis. (Gore,
2002)
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These justifications for precaution are virtually verbatim the same
justifications given by President Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair
for preventive intervention to fight the uncertain risk of terrorism.
‘‘President Bush argued that the risk of WMD was great enough to warrant
an attack, without absolute proof that Iraq was hiding such weapons. That’s
the PP [Precautionary Principle], American style’’, according to Samuel
Loewenberg writing in the New York Times (Loewenberg, 2003).
Moreover, the Bush administration also adopted the precautionary
strategy of shifting the burden of proof. The traditional basis for the use of
force in national self-defense is that the country has been attacked, or that an
attack is imminent. The burden of proof is on the country exercising
preemptive self-defense to show that its enemy is about to attack. There was
no evidence that Iraq was about to attack the US or the UK, but there were
intelligence claims that Iraq had capabilities—WMD—to attack without
warning and with catastrophic consequences. Still, during the 1990s the
burden of proof was on the US and the UN Security Council to find evidence
of Iraqi WMD before authorizing further sanctions or intervention. Hence
the team of UN inspectors searched for WMD in Iraq (until evicted by
former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in 1998); and hence even after 9/11,
the US and the UK had a hard time convincing other countries that invading
Iraq was warranted. Then the Bush and Blair administrations made the
argument that, instead, it was Hussein who bore the burden of proof—to
show that Iraq had no WMD, by cooperating with inspectors, disclosing any
WMD or precursor material and disarming. Shifting the burden of proof was
a centerpiece of Secretary of State Colin Powell’s landmark speech to the UN
on February 5, 2003, presenting the case for war. Canadian Foreign Minister
Bill Graham commented that the speech ‘‘amounts to a transfer of the
burden of proof from the United States to Saddam Hussein’’ (Murphy,
2003). Secretary Powell reiterated the burden-shifting point to the UN
Security Council a month later (Powell, 2003). Back in December 2002,
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer had said: ‘‘The burden of proof
lies with Saddam Hussein’’ (Fleischer, 2002). Madeleine Albright, secretary
of state in the Clinton Administration, had agreed: ‘‘there’s no question that
the burden of proof is on Iraq. I mean we’ve all said that; everybody believes
that’’ (Warner, 2002).
This is precisely the same type of shift in the burden of proof advocated
under the Precautionary Principle: instead of the government regulatory
agency having to prove that a substance or activity is dangerous,
the applicant or proponent of an activity or process or chemical needs to
demonstrate that the environment and public health will be safe. The proof
must shift to the party or entity that will benefit from the activity and that is
most likely to have the information. (Raffensperger and Tickner, 1999)

Like Secretary Powell, Prime Minister Blair made the same move:
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Blair’s position can just as well be expressed in the more neutral language of
precaution. What lawyers, bureaucrats and even some philosophers like to call
the Precautionary Principle states that when faced with risks with uncertain
and potentially catastrophic downsides, it’s always better to err on the side of
caution. In such circumstances, the burden of proof is said to lie with those
who downplay the risk of disaster, rather than with those who argue that the
risks are real, even if they might be quite small. This appears to be Blair’s
current position on the war in Iraq. (Runciman, 2004)

To be sure, it can be difficult for the actor facing government action to
prove that its products are safe or that it has no WMD, because it is difficult
to prove a negative. If Hussein had disclosed some WMD material, that
would have incited greater suspicion of finding further hidden WMD at risk
of imminent use, not relief that he had come clean. If Hussein had insisted he
had no WMD, that would have been called stonewalling; the inability of UN
and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to find WMD
after they returned to Iraq in 2002 was treated as unpersuasive by US
intelligence agencies (Select Committee on Intelligence, 2004). The tactic of
shifting the burden of proof, while potentially a sensible incentive to elicit
important information, does make the case for government action harder to
resist—which is precisely the objective of the burden-shifting tactic in both
the Precautionary Principle and the Bush counterterrorism strategy.
Parallel Critiques of Precaution
Further indication of the shift to precaution comes from the criticisms
leveled against the new strategy. The criticisms of precaution against
terrorism are virtually identical to the criticisms of precaution on
environmental risks—but on the opposite political feet. When the US
announced its new doctrine of anticipatory war in September 2002, German
Foreign Minister (and Green Party vice-chairman) Joschka Fischer worried
aloud to the UN General Assembly:
To what consequences would military intervention lead? … Are there new and
definite findings and facts? Does the threat assessment justify taking a very
high risk? …we are full of deep skepticism regarding military action…
(Fischer, 2002)

While the US government wanted fast and forceful action to prevent the
next terrorist attack, despite the uncertainty of the threat, its detractors in
Europe wanted more evidence—‘‘findings of fact’’ and a ‘‘threat assessment’’, in Fischer’s words—and deliberation before acting (ironically,
precisely the stance that European Greens oppose as an obstacle to
precautionary regulations on food safety and the environment). After the
war in Iraq and the failure to find compelling evidence that Iraq was creating
or deploying WMD (Duelfer, 2004), critics, such as columnist Paul
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Krugman, have questioned whether the US and the UK acted prematurely
(Krugman, 2003), in effect, whether the US and the UK ‘‘cried wolf’’ and
undertook precaution based on a false positive. This same critique was
leveled by skeptics of precaution in the environmental arena (Wildavsky,
1995). In September 2003, chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix told a
Greek newspaper that:
It is clear that the critical thinking we applied led us less astray than did the
assertive thinking of the US administration … We never said there were
weapons of mass destruction. What we said was that the Iraqis could not
answer all our questions regarding their arsenal. But, for the Bush
administration, ’’unaccounted for’’ equaled ’’existing’’. (Blix, 2003)

The Bush position described by Blix is the same as that of advocates of
precautionary environmental regulation, who say that ‘‘absence of evidence’’
of harmfulness ‘‘is not evidence of absence’’ of harmfulness, and therefore
that regulation should go forward to address the potential risk even without
clear evidence. Even the then-Republican chair of the House Intelligence
Committee, J. Porter Goss (now the president’s appointee heading the CIA),
and the Democrat ranking member of the Committee, Jane Harman, sent a
joint letter to the Bush administration complaining that the case for invading
to seize WMD in Iraq had been based on intelligence beset with ‘‘too many
uncertainties’’ (Hulse and Sanger, 2003)—precisely the critique that the
Precautionary Principle aims to overcome. The New York Times editorialized: ‘‘If intelligence and risk assessment are sketchy—and when are they
not?—using them as the basis for pre-emptive war poses enormous dangers’’
(The New York Times, 2003). Replace ‘‘pre-emptive war’’ with ‘‘precautionary regulation’’, and one has the standard industry line against health
and environmental policy.
Meanwhile, the Bush administration itself has been a critic of precaution
on food and environmental risks, emphasizing uncertainty as a reason not to
act. ‘‘Mr. Bush, explaining to senators why he opposed the Kyoto protocol
on global warming, spoke of the ‘incomplete state of scientific knowledge of
the causes of, and solutions to, global climate change’’’, according to
Anthony Lewis writing in the New York Times (Lewis, 2001). The Bush
administration official in charge of regulatory policy has called the
Precautionary Principle ‘‘a mythical concept, perhaps like a unicorn’’
(Loewenberg, 2003).
The war in Afghanistan was precautionary in the sense of anticipating
and attempting to prevent Al Qaeda’s next attack, but it was also in direct
response to clear evidence of threat, namely the attacks of 9/11. The war in
Iraq was far more precautionary. The evidence of risk was highly uncertain
before the war, with speculative and circumstantial evidence of WMD and
tenuous links asserted between Al Qaeda and Iraq. But the small and
uncertain probability of a catastrophic outcome was cognizable, and is
precisely the situation to which the Precautionary Principle speaks
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(Runciman, 2004). Now, with several extensive reports in both the US and
the UK finding that no WMD threat existed in Iraq before the war, and the
US search for WMD in Iraq having officially ended on January 11, 2005, the
invasion of Iraq appears to have been premised on a serious false positive
(Duelfer, 2004; Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US
Regarding WMD, 2005 March 31). This simply underscores the degree to
which the war itself was a highly precautionary move: undertaken in
anticipation of a serious threat but under enormous uncertainty about the
risk, with very little good evidence to back it up, and with far greater
concern about false negatives (WMD unknown but existing) than about
false positives (WMD claimed but not existing).
To be sure, it is possible that the WMD did exist but have been moved or
hidden someplace else. And, even if the WMD did not exist, the ex ante risk
assessment may have been sufficiently worrisome to warrant precaution
despite the high chance of error (Runciman, 2004; Weeks, 2003). These
possibilities are part and parcel of precaution against an uncertain risk with
a high damage worst-case scenario. Alternatively, perhaps the risk of WMD
was not the real underlying motivation for the war; perhaps the real reason
was liberating the Iraqi people, spreading democracy, deterring other rogue
states, or even seizing control of oil resources, or something else. But critics
of precaution in the health and environmental arena make the same
complaint: that precaution is a cover for other motives, such as disguised
trade protectionism. The basic point remains that the new National Security
Strategy, and the stated rationale for specific actions taken pursuant to it
(including the war in Iraq), are the Precautionary Principle applied to
terrorism.1
Precaution, Pre-emption and Prevention
The degree to which the new Bush doctrine is highly precautionary is evident
from the corresponding terminologies of regulation and war. In the
regulatory arena, the Precautionary Principle advocates intervention to
forestall uncertain risks. Some authors distinguish ‘‘precautionary’’ regulation from ‘‘preventive’’ regulation, arguing that precaution applies to
unknown risks whereas prevention applies to known risks (Sanderson and
1

Olivier Godard (2003) argues that the Iraq War does not correspond to more sophisticated
versions of the Precautionary Principle. Godard’s argument is that more sophisticated
versions of the Precautionary Principle, such as the European Commission’s Feb. 2000
Communication on the Precautionary Principle, redefine the Precautionary Principle as a
form of decision analysis requiring scientific risk analysis, proportionality, provisionality, and
benefit-cost analysis—in contrast to more aggressive versions of the Precautionary Principle
that reject such analysis. What we show is that the war in Iraq and the US National Security
Strategy do correspond to the language and logic of the more aggressive versions of the
Precautionary Principle that lack such decision analytic features. That is why we call in this
paper for the application of such decision analysis to improve precautionary counterterrorism
policymaking.
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Peterson, 2001; EEA, 2002). This distinction is vague at best, because there
is no such thing as a ‘‘known’’ risk; all risks are uncertain, and there are
simply degrees of uncertainty (hence degrees of precaution). But in any case,
the distinction between ‘‘precautionary’’ and ‘‘preventive’’ regulation
corresponds fairly closely to the parallel distinction between ‘‘preventive’’
and ‘‘preemptive’’ war, respectively. Preemptive war (like preventive
regulation) is anticipatory self-defense against an imminent (i.e., ‘‘known’’)
threat. Preventive war (like precautionary regulation) is more aggressive: it is
anticipatory self-defense without an imminent threat. Preventive war is more
aggressive, more anticipatory, more likely to target false positives and less
accepted (if at all) under international law, than preemptive war (Jervis,
2003).
Traditionally, under international law, preemptive war is legal if in selfdefense against imminent attack, but not against highly uncertain threats.
Emmerich de Vattel wrote that ‘‘A Nation has the right to resist the injury
another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force … against the aggressor. It
may even anticipate the other’s design, being careful, however, not to act
upon vague and doubtful suspicions, lest it should run the risk of becoming
itself the aggressor’’ (Ackerman, 2003). US Secretary of State Daniel
Webster articulated the criteria for legitimate preemptive war in the Caroline
incident: an intrusion into the territory of another state can be justified as an
act of self-defense only in those ‘‘cases in which the necessity of that selfdefense is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of means and no
moment for deliberation’’ (Ackerman, 2003). Moreover, the force used in
such circumstances has to do ‘‘nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the
act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that
necessity, and kept clearly within it’’ (Ackerman, 2003). Similarly, Michael
Walzer argues that ‘‘Both individuals and states can rightfully defend
themselves against violence that is imminent but not actual; they can fire the
first shots if they know themselves about to be attacked’’, but that preventive
war is not just because there is not yet a real prospect of being attacked
(Walzer, 1977). Historically, the US has engaged in preemptive military
strikes against imminent threats on numerous occasions (Grimmett, 2003).
The UN Charter requires that members settle their disputes through
peaceful means—members should refrain from the threat or use of force (Art.
2(3)–(4) of UN Charter). The only stated exceptions to this rule are found in
Art. 51, which preserves the right of any member to engage in self-defense
against armed attack, and Art. 42, which allows for collective actions through
the Security Council. No explicit exception is made for preventive war. Article
51 provides that ‘‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security’’.
Some argue that this language limits self-defense to retaliation only after
‘‘an armed attack occurs’’, but others contend that such an interpretation is
too narrow because it would bar preemptive self-defense even against a
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clearly imminent attack (Ackerman, 2003). The advent of WMD held by
rogue states or terrorists is forcing legal experts to revisit the distinction
between preemptive and preventive war. David Ackerman notes, ‘‘[T]here is
at present no consensus either in theory or practice about whether the
possession or development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by a
rogue state justifies the preemptive use of force. Most analysts recognize that
if overwhelmingly lethal weaponry is possessed by a nation willing to use
that weaponry directly or through surrogates (such as terrorists), some kind
of anticipatory self-defense may be a matter of national survival; and
many—including the Bush administration—contend that international law
ought to allow, if it does not already do so, for the preemptive use of force in
that situation. But many states and analysts are decidedly reluctant to
legitimate the preemptive use of force against threats that are only potential
and not actual on the grounds the justification can easily be abused’’
(Ackerman, 2003). Regarding the war in Iraq, Ackerman observes that ‘‘Iraq
had not attacked the U.S., nor did it appear to pose an imminent threat of
attack in traditional military terms. As a consequence, it seems doubtful that
the use of force against Iraq could be deemed to meet the traditional legal
tests justifying preemptive attack. But Iraq may have possessed WMD, and it
may have had ties to terrorist groups that seek to use such weapons against
the US’’ (Ackerman, 2003).
Anne Marie Slaughter and Lee Feinstein argue that the rules governing
the use of force, developed in 1945 and contained in the UN Charter, were
designed for an era in which threats emerged from sovereign states and
conventional armies. ‘‘In the twenty-first century’’, they argue, ‘‘maintaining
global peace and security requires states to be proactive rather than reactive’’
(Feinstein and Slaughter, 2004). The gravest threat, they argue, is posed by
states pursuing WMD that are headed by rulers with no internal checks on
their power or who support terrorists. Under these circumstances, there
should be a ‘‘responsibility to prevent’’ acquisition of WMD. ‘‘In a world in
which … governments can get access to the most devastating weapons and
make them available to terrorists, we must take action’’, they assert. The
rules regarding use of force ‘‘can continue to serve us well only if they are
reviewed and updated to meet a new set of threats. Accepting a collective
duty to prevent is the first step toward sustained self-protection in a new and
dangerous era’’ (Feinstein and Slaughter, 2004).
Law professor John Yoo, who served in the Bush Justice Department,
also argues that national self-defense must be understood to allow preventive
attacks against uncertain threats of WMD (Yoo, 2004). He goes further to
propose that the right of national self-defense in Article 51 be reconceived as
a cost-benefit test, weighing the probability and consequence of a WMD
attack, the effectiveness of the preventive measure in avoiding such attack,
and the costs of the attack. That approach would authorize preventive
measures long before ‘‘an armed attack occurs’’, but it would constrain
preventive war by the cost-benefit test. (Whether precautionary regulation in
the health and environmental arena can be consistent with cost-benefit
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analysis remains in controversy. Many advocates of the Precautionary
Principle see it as authorizing much government action that would not pass
an economist’s cost-benefit test, a test that they view as flawed and unduly
constraining (Jordan and O’Riordan, 1999). Others have argued that
precaution can and should be reframed in terms of a cost-benefit test with
appropriate premia for catastrophic risks (Pearce, 2004; European
Commission, 2000; Graham and Wiener, 1995; Keeney and von
Winterfeldt, 2001; Dekay et al., 2002; Stewart, 2002; Gollier and Treich,
2003; Farrow, 2004; Posner, 2004a.)
Even if preventive war (precaution) is warranted against uncertain risks
of WMD, there remains the question of who should authorize such action.
Slaughter and Feinstein referred to a ‘‘collective’’ responsibility to prevent.
The High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change commissioned by
the UN Secretary General and transmitted to the UN on December 1, 2004,
addressed anticipatory self-defense in precisely this situation: scenarios
involving terrorists, weapons of mass destruction and irresponsible states.
The panel (whose membership included Brent Scowcroft, former national
security adviser to President George H. W. Bush) agreed that preventive
measures may be needed and justified ‘‘where the threat in question is not
imminent but still claimed to be real: for example the acquisition, with
allegedly hostile intent, of nuclear weapons-making capability … [but] Can a
State, without going to the Security Council, claim in these circumstances the
right to act, in anticipatory self-defense (sic), not just preemptively (against
an imminent or proximate one) but preventively (against a non-imminent or
non-proximate one)?’’(High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, 2004). Recognizing the argument in favor of precaution, ‘‘that
the potential harm from some threats (e.g., terrorists armed with a nuclear
weapon) is so great that one simply cannot risk waiting until they become
imminent, and that less harm may be done (e.g., avoiding a nuclear exchange
or radioactive fallout from a reactor destruction) by acting earlier’’, the
answer for an individual state, the High Level Panel advised the Secretary
General, should still be no.
The short answer is that if there are good arguments for preventive military
action, with good evidence to support them, they should be put to the Security
Council, which can authorize such action if it chooses to. If it does not so
choose, there will be, by definition, time to pursue other strategies, including
persuasion, negotiation, deterrence and containment—and to visit again the
military option. … For those impatient with such a response, the answer must
be that, in a world full of perceived potential threats, the risk to the global
order and the norm of non-intervention on which it continues to be based is
simply too great for the legality of unilateral preventive action, as distinct from
collectively endorsed action, to be accepted. Allowing one to so act is to allow
all. …the international community does have to be concerned about nightmare
scenarios combining terrorists, weapons of mass destruction and irresponsible
States, and much more besides, which may conceivably justify the use of force,
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not just reactive but preventively and before a latent threat becomes imminent.
The question is not whether such action can be taken: it can, by the Security
Council as the international community’s collective security voice, at any time
it deems that there is a threat …(High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, 2004)

In a companion op-ed article, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
summarized the panel’s criteria for preventive war:
The use of force: …

N
N
N
N
N

Seriousness of threat: Is the threat serious enough to justify prima facie the
use of force?
Proper purpose: Is the primary purpose of the proposed use of force to
halt or avert the threat in question?
Last resort: Has every non-military option been explored and exhausted?
Proportional means: Is the force proposed the minimum necessary to meet
the threat?
Balance of consequences: Is it clear that the consequences of action will
not be worse than the consequences of inaction?
The report sees no need to amend Article 51 of the UN Charter, which
preserves the right of all states to act in self-defense against armed attack,
including the right to take pre-emptive action against an imminent threat.
However, in the new security environment in which we live, states may also
fear threats that are neither imminent nor proximate, but which could
culminate in horrific violence if left to fester. The Security Council is already
fully empowered by the charter to deal with these threats. It must be prepared
to do so, taking decisive action earlier than in the past, when asked to act by
states that have based their claims on reliable evidence (Annan, 2004).

The point here is not to settle the legal question whether preemptive or
preventive war by individual states violates international law, nor whether
that is what international law should hold, nor whether the current war in
Iraq would satisfy the criteria for preemptive self-defense, nor whether the
international law of war really influences governments’ behavior. The point
here is merely to say that the Bush doctrine announced in 2002, calling for
unilateral anticipatory military attacks against potential threats before
evidence of an imminent threat has been shown, amounts to a highly
precautionary strategy to combat the risks of terrorism and WMD, with
uncertainty being no excuse for inaction. It is substantially more anticipatory
against substantially more uncertain risks than is preemptive self-defense,
and than is collective prevention by the UN Security Council (Jervis, 2003).
Whether the Bush doctrine of precautionary counterterrorism is desirable or
not depends on its consequences, which are evaluated below.
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One can of course envision other precautionary counterterrorism
strategies that the Bush administration has not taken. For example, the
government could forcibly confine all members of the potential terrorists’
ethnic group in an internment camp, with no evidence that any of these
people poses a real threat, but acting on the uncertain risk that they might
cause serious harm. The US adopted such a policy with respect to JapaneseAmericans in World War Two, and some staunch counterterrorism
advocates propose a similar policy today (Malkin, 2004). Another highly
precautionary measure would be to ban all entry to US borders by travelers
from certain countries. Another would be to wage preventive war against
additional countries, such as Iran, Pakistan and North Korea. The Bush
administration has not taken these steps, perhaps because it is distracted and
bogged down in Iraq, or perhaps because it recognizes the adverse
consequences of excessive precaution—the topic of the following section.
Why the Precautionary Approach Now?
The US and other countries have used preemptive strikes in the past, but the
adoption of an overall strategy of pre-emption and preventive war is a new
frontier (Weeks, 2003). Several factors drove this shift to a more
precautionary approach in US and UK strategy.
Strategic Need
First, as noted above, experts sought the shift on the grounds that the Cold
War strategies of deterrence and containment would be far less effective
against non-state actors using suicide surprise attacks, and that such attacks
could be catastrophic. This therefore created the need for a more
anticipatory strategy that incapacitates the threat before it occurs. But the
application of this strategy to specific places (such as Afghanistan and Iraq)
depends on risk assessments—intelligence estimates and threat information—that appear to have overstated the risk of WMD in Iraq (a false
positive). The Economist magazine initially urged ‘‘The case for war’’ in the
August 3, 2002 issue, and later ventured ‘‘The case for war—revisited’’ in
the July 19, 2003 issue after WMD failed to turn up, but then ran two cover
photos of President Bush and Prime Minister Blair with the disillusioned
headlines ‘‘Wielders of mass deception?’’ on October 4, 2003, and then
‘‘Sincere deceivers’’ on July 17, 2004.
Risk Assessment and its Errors
Second, then, was the overstatement of risk by expert risk assessors (the
intelligence community) and by policy officials. For example, before the war,
CIA Director George Tenet told President Bush that the case for finding
WMD in Iraq was a ‘‘slam dunk’’ (in 2005 he said those were, ‘‘the two
dumbest words I ever said’’) (Goldenberg, 2005). Relying on that
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assessment, President Bush said in his 2003 State of the Union speech that
Iraq was seeking materials for nuclear weapons from Niger, a claim that
later appeared to have been false and based in part on a forged document.
Secretary of State Powell enumerated ostensible evidence of WMD in Iraq to
the UN in February, 2003. The UK government said that Iraqi forces could
deploy WMD within 45 minutes. Yet after the war, no WMD were found,
and high-level panels called the prewar assessments ‘‘dead wrong’’ (Butler
et al., 2004). These overstatements were in part a reaction to the 9/11
surprise attacks, and the intelligence failures they had represented—that is,
an effort to avoid making the same false negative error a second time,
especially if the second time could be with WMD.
The overstatement of risk by expert risk assessors bears detailed scrutiny.
The claim of WMD in Iraq—the central premise of the precautionary
strategy to wage preventive war—was crucial in motivating both leaders and
the public to go to war, but appears in retrospect to have been a false
positive. Past false negatives (neglect) can spur future false positives
(overreaction). Analysts have been wrong about WMD programs many
times in the past. Cases include the Soviet Union in 1949, China in 1964,
India in 1974, Iraq in 1991, North Korea in 1994, Iraq in 1995, India in
1998, Pakistan in 1998, North Korea in 2002, Iran in 2003 and Libya in
2003. ‘‘In each of these cases’’, Peter Feaver explains, ‘‘the WMD program
turned out to be more advanced than the intelligence community thought’’
(Feaver, 2004). This list of false negative failures helps to explain why the
intelligence community might have overstated its findings—determined to
get it right this time—especially in the immediate aftermath of the surprise
attacks of 9/11. Paul Pillar argues that the major failure was not of the
intelligence agencies neglecting the risk, but of the policy officials neglecting
the intelligence. He notes that attacks in the 1990s made intelligence
agencies well aware of Al Qaeda, that the CIA created its first-ever unit
aimed at a single individual (Osama bin Laden), and that the Clinton
administration considered striking bin Laden several times but held back for
fear of missing, collateral damage or other concerns (Pillar, 2004a). There
was significant warning of Al Qaeda’s intent to strike in the US—such as the
famous Presidential Daily Briefing of August 6, 2001 (‘‘Bin Laden
Determined to Strike Within the US’’), as well as the earlier National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) produced in 1995, warning that Islamist
terrorists might try to blend into US immigrant Muslim populations and
use conventional weapons or civil aviation to attack landmarks such as Wall
Street and the White House (Pillar, 2004a). There were also clues of the
hijackers’ plans at regional FBI offices that did not get adequate attention, as
cited by the 9/11 Commission Report (National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States, 2004). It is easy in hindsight, knowing which
attack actually occurred, to forget that before 9/11 these strands competed
for attention amid many other hints and threats, and it was not simple to
sort the true positives from the false ones. Still, the false negative of 9/11 was
stunning. ‘‘Though analysts have been wrong on major issues in the past, no
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previous intelligence failure has been so costly as the September 11th
attacks’’, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded in 2004.
While they found no evidence that analysts had been politically pressured to
exaggerate the links between Al Qaeda and Hussein, or the progress of Iraq’s
WMD programs, it is easy to imagine that analysts might have felt pressured
by their own earlier mistakes, especially the most recent one that perhaps
could have prevented the deaths of nearly 3000 innocent civilians (Select
Committee on Intelligence, 2004).2 The Butler Report on UK intelligence
observed: ‘‘It is a well-known phenomenon within intelligence communities
that memory of past failures can cause over-estimation next time around’’
(Butler et al., 2004).
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that most of the
key judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002, Iraq’s
Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, were either
‘‘overstated or were not supported by the underlying intelligence reporting’’
(Select Committee on Intelligence, 2004). The intelligence community did
not adequately explain its uncertainties to policy makers, especially with
regard to Iraq’s nuclear program. It suffered a ‘‘group think’’ mentality that
led collectors and managers to interpret ambiguous evidence as conclusive.
Normal procedures for probing assumptions, such as ‘‘red teams’’, were not
utilized. When dual-use equipment was discovered in Iraq, the community
ignored information that should have made it clear that some of the
equipment was actually being used for conventional purposes. ‘‘None of the
guidance given to human intelligence collectors suggested that collection be
focused on determining whether Iraq had WMD. Instead, the requirements
assumed that Iraq had WMD, and focused on uncovering those activities…’’
(Select Committee on Intelligence, 2004). There was no probing of
presumptions. The reason there were no spies on the ground in Iraq,
intelligence officials told the committee, was that it was too difficult and
dangerous to sustain an intelligence operation there (Select Committee on
Intelligence, 2004).
Improving the odds of distinguishing true positives, false positives and
false negatives requires real-time intelligence of a type not currently
available, at least according to a number of recent assessments of the US
intelligence community. A commission appointed by President Bush
concluded in March 2005 that the US ‘‘knows disturbingly little about the
nuclear programs of many of the world’s most dangerous actors’’, that
knowledge about the spread of biological weapons programs is also
inadequate and, bluntly, that US agencies were ‘‘dead wrong’’ about
WMD in Iraq (Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the US
Regarding WMD, 2005). Assessments by the CIA of Iraq’s capabilities prior
to the war in Iraq were ‘‘crippled by its inability to collect meaningful
2

The Select Committee on Intelligence, for instance, found after 9/11 that the CIA presumed
that Iraq had WMD but discounted evidence to the contrary.
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intelligence’’ on Iraq’s WMD programs. Instead, intelligence analysts relied
on ‘‘old assumptions’’ and then ‘‘swathed them in the mystique of
intelligence, providing secret information that seemed to support them but
was in fact nearly worthless, if not misleading’’ (Shane and Sanger, 2005).
The commission also accused the intelligence community of having ‘‘an
almost perfect record of resisting external recommendations’’, and of
refusing to adapt to a world of very different threats from those faced during
the Cold War’’ (Shane and Sanger, 2005). The Senate Intelligence
Committee report on the quality of pre-war intelligence on Iraq found that
the US had no sources in Iraq collecting intelligence on Iraq’s WMD
programs after 1998 and concluded that the intelligence community relied so
heavily on foreign government services and third party reporting that it was
putting the nation at risk of manipulation by other governments (Select
Committee on Intelligence, 2004).
While these review commissions emphasized that the intelligence on Iraq
overstated the risk of WMD, the president emphasized the opposite
problem: ‘‘Our collection and analysis of intelligence will never be perfect,
but in an age where our margin for error is getting smaller, in an age in
which we are at war, the consequences of underestimating a threat could be
tens of thousands of innocent lives’’, Bush said, promising intelligence
reforms that would ‘‘allow us to identify threats before they fully emerge so
we can take effective action to protect the American people’’ (Shane and
Sanger, 2005). This approach to uncertainty, as we have seen, is the
Precautionary Principle in action.
Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-West Virginia), the vice-chairman of the
Senate Select Intelligence Committee, called the intelligence ‘‘profoundly
flawed on all subjects’’, and also accused the Bush administration of
‘‘exaggerating intelligence’’ and ‘‘going beyond it to try to convince the
American people that war was the way to go’’ (Meet the Press, 2004). The
subsequent assessment by the panel commissioned by President Bush (cochaired by Judge Laurence Silberman and Senator Charles Robb (DVirginia)) concluded that the NIE of October 2002 was, as noted above,
‘‘dead wrong’’, and called the president’s Daily Briefs even ‘‘more alarmist
and less nuanced’’ than the NIE (Shane and Sanger, 2005). Senate Select
Intelligence Committee Chair Pat Roberts agreed with the new panel report
(Meet the Press, 2005).
Similarly, the report by the committee chaired by Lord Butler, which
assessed the quality of UK intelligence prior to the war, found that evidence
was stretched to the ‘‘outer limits’’ in making the case for war (Butler et al.,
2004) and that ‘‘group-think’’ was a major problem (Butler et al., 2004).
Neutrality and objectivity were compromised by the government’s need for a
document it could draw on to advocate the case for war, putting the
intelligence services under great strain (Butler et al., 2004). The UK
government dossier of 24 September 2002 that made the case for war in Iraq
omitted many caveats about the ‘‘unclear’’ and ‘‘uncertain’’ nature of the
intelligence, suggesting that it was ‘‘fuller and firmer’’ than it actually was
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(Butler et al., 2004). In the dossier, ‘‘points were run together and the
caveats on the intelligence were dropped’’ and ‘‘warnings’’ on the ‘‘limited
intelligence base’’ were omitted (Butler et al., 2004). For example, the
famous claim that Iraq could launch an attack with WMD within
‘‘45 minutes’’ was meant to refer to battlefield deployment in Iraq, not a
strike in Europe, but that qualification was dropped as drafts of the dossier
were edited, and the claim itself is now deemed doubtful (Butler et al.,
2004). The Butler Report did note some intelligence successes, such as the
discovery of a Pakistani scientist’s sales of nuclear know-how to other
countries.
The post-9/11 overstatements of Iraqi WMD were not the first time that
intelligence agencies fell into the trap of overestimating the threat this time
because last time it was underestimated. In his assessment of Israeli
intelligence failures with regard to Iraq, retired Israeli General Shlomo Brom
attributed the adoption of worst-case scenarios to a desire to avoid blame for
underestimating threats. The intelligence failure prior to the Yom Kippur
War created a culture of ‘‘assigning culpability and punishing those
responsible’’. Analysts thus have an incentive to exaggerate the enemies’
capabilities because they ‘‘feel that by giving bleak assessments they decrease
the threat to themselves’’. If the assessment is correct, they will be treated as
heroes, he wrote, and if it is wrong, no one will pay much attention ‘‘because
everyone will be pleased that their bleak prophecies did not materialize’’
(Brom, 2003). It is worth recalling that Iraq had claimed it possessed WMD
in the 1990s, including several tons of the nerve agent VX, as well as
botulinum toxin and aflatoxin—the latter a slow-acting carcinogen with no
battlefield utility, implying its sole use to terrorize civilian populations
(Stern, 1999). An internal CIA analysis argued that although mistakes were
evident in retrospect, the prewar assessment of Iraq’s WMD was reasonable
based on the information that was available at the time (Jehl, 2004).
Psychology: Availability, Fear and Dread
In addition to the strategic need for a proactive response to non-state actors
using suicide, and the overstatement of risk by expert risk assessors and
policy officials, a third key driver of the shift to precaution was the
psychological element: availability, fear and dread. The availability heuristic
is the tendency to respond aggressively to alarming events that are
‘‘available’’ or vivid in people’s minds (Kahneman et al., 1982). People
tend to exaggerate the likelihood of such events (relative to risks that are
statistically more likely) because they are easy to imagine or recall, and to
support more stringent protective measures against available risks. Yet lowprobability, high-consequence catastrophic events, such as a major terrorist
attack or an asteroid collision, are by definition rare, and so not easily
available. In general, therefore, people tend to understate the risk of lowprobability, high-consequence events such as terrorist attacks, ignoring or
lampooning remote chances of catastrophes (even when such events warrant
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precaution on an expected value basis), perhaps because they lack experience
with such rare extreme events or because the mind avoids the mental burden
of contemplating the horrific (Posner, 2004a; Dana, 2003). This leads to
false negative errors, catastrophic surprise and hindsight recriminations. But
once such an event, or one similar to it, has recently occurred, the
availability heuristic is triggered and people tend to overstate the risk of
another catastrophic event (Slovic, 2000; Slovic and Weber, 2003; Sunstein,
2003). ‘‘US citizens and their elected leaders respond far more readily to
dramatic events in their midst than to warnings and analyses about
threatening events yet to occur’’ (Pillar, 2004b). ‘‘Experience has shown that
major policy changes tend to come only from actual disasters’’ (Pillar,
2004a). One available event can set in motion a cascade of public clamor for
stringent protective measures against similar events even if they are not
causally connected, such as fear of genetically modified foods driven by mad
cow disease, and even if other risks deserve more prospective attention
(Sunstein and Kuran, 1999). The adoption of major health and environmental legislation was similarly driven by crisis events such as the burning of
the Cuyahoga River, pollution in Lake Erie and the discovery of toxic waste
in Love Canal (Andrews, 1999; Percival, 1998).
Consistent with the availability heuristic, President Bush and Vice
President Dick Cheney have expressly justified the war in Iraq as a response
to 9/11, even if there was no evidence linking the two. Although experts had
been warning for years of the potential for mass-casualty terrorism and of Al
Qaeda’s likely involvement in such attacks, with the highly visible 9/11 event
terrorism suddenly rose to the top of the national agenda. Earlier, the US had
not made aviation risks a priority because there had been no hijackings of US
airplanes since 1986—no available events to spark concern (Posner, 2004b).
Other terrorist attacks against the US were seen as far away (e.g. Lebanon,
Kobar Towers, USS Cole) or as one-time crimes (Oklahoma City). Still, the
government did take steps after these events to harden government facilities
against attack and to strike at Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Sudan. Yet it is
unclear why the US did not react more strongly to the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing—perhaps because it was not highly damaging. After the 9/
11 attacks, and the anthrax letters and sniper attacks in Washington DC, the
US public was far more ready to support aggressive counterterrorism policies
because of such psychological availability, even if the probability of such
attacks remained roughly the same as it had been since at least 1993. Many
proverbial barn doors were closed after 9/11, even if those barn doors had
little to do with the likelihood of future horses escaping (and yet other doors,
such as ports and mass transit, remained relatively open).
Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, ‘‘[i]t is only in those West European
states which have suffered protracted and destructive campaigns of terror
that the existence of special antiterrorist legislation has been accepted’’,
writes Chalk (Chalk, 1996). After 9/11, Prime Minister Blair admitted that
he was deeply influenced by its horrors in his assessment of the threat of
Iraq. While he had already been deeply concerned about the proliferation of
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WMD and the threat posed by bin Laden, ‘‘after September 11th it took on a
completely different aspect … what changed for me with September 11th was
that I thought then you have to change your mindset … you have to deal
with this because otherwise the threat will grow’’, as quoted in the Butler
Report (Butler et al., 2004).
In a sense, this psychological and political dynamic renders the actions
taken less strictly precautionary: they are reactions to the recent past crisis as
much as or more than anticipatory protections against uncertain future risks.
But even though driven by past crises, the content of the policies adopted is
strongly precautionary, authorizing government to act aggressively to
prevent uncertain future risks.
Here the availability heuristic was compounded by dread—the abject
fear of sinister, mysterious or unnatural risks (Stern, 2002; Slovic, 1987;
Sunstein, 2003). The envisioned threat—of WMD being wielded by suicidal
foreign religious fanatics who hate the US—is an inescapable source of
dread. Dread can motivate decision-makers to take particularly aggressive
actions to avoid risk and can lead the public to support leaders who are seen
to take aggressive action. When dangers evoke a strong sense of dread,
policy makers are particularly susceptible to implement risk-reduction
policies with little regard to countervailing dangers (Stern, 1999, 2003a). It
has long been observed that the things that frighten us most are often quite
different from those most likely to harm us (Slovic, 1987; Sunstein, 2003).
Psychologists have found that fear is disproportionately evoked by certain
qualitative attributes of risks, including: involuntary exposure, unfamiliarity, invisibility, catastrophic potential, latency and uncertainty (Slovic, 1987;
Sunstein, 2005).
Terrorism—especially with WMD—is unusual in that it possesses all of
the characteristics that psychologists have shown to be conducive to
disproportionate dread. The radius of fear generated by a terrorist attack far
exceeds the zone of injury and death. It is a form of psychological warfare
whose goal is to bolster the morale of its supporters, and demoralize and
frighten its target audience—victims and their sympathizers. US citizens are
now living in a dread-full age—of shoe-bombers and orange alerts, of
suicide-murderers and dirty bombs, of pronouncements by our enemies that
they will destroy our country.
Compounding and amplifying this dread is the element of ‘‘evil’’. Evil is
difficult to define, let alone to measure. In the 9/11 terrorist attacks, many of
the classic components of evil—including malice, premeditation, surprise
attack without warning or ultimatum, the killing of thousands of innocent
civilians and suicide attack—have ‘‘rarely been so well combined’’,
according to Susan Nieman (2004). Evil, disgust and fear seem to be
related. What is evil disgusts and frightens us; what disgusts us may seem
tainted with evil (Miller, 1997). Evil evokes maximal dread. If a leader can
persuade us we are fighting evil itself, we are more likely to make sacrifices,
and more prone to throw caution aside in regard to new risks introduced by
our actions. Hence, a war against evil is proclaimed by both sides—by the
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terrorists rallying jihad, and the target countries rallying the war on terror.
Dread of evil cements societies, Jeremy Bentham observed, more than the
hope for good (Bentham, 1830). Thus, four days after the 9/11 terrorist
strikes, President Bush announced that his administration would ‘‘rid the
world of evil-doers’’ (Peres-Rivas, 2001). He has referred to rogue states
seeking WMD as an ‘‘axis of evil’’.
The mission of fighting evil, articulated during the period of maximal
pain and confusion in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, made
highly precautionary policy remedies that would have been unthinkable only
days before the attacks suddenly seem urgent. The administration
announced that it would hold suspects in detention indefinitely, without
charges and with no access to lawyers. Congress approved new legislation,
the USA Patriot Act, in the space of weeks, and reorganized much of the
government into the Department of Homeland Security and a new
intelligence structure. The US, UK and allies invaded Afghanistan soon
after, and later Iraq.
Analyzing the Consequences of Precaution Against Terrorism and WMD
We start from the basic premise that governments should think things
through before taking action. The world is complex and interconnected, and
interventions will have multiple consequences, both intended and unintended (Wiener, 2004). Successful counterterrorism strategy and action
requires consideration of its expected consequences before adopting policies
or deploying forces. The need for such impact analysis is heightened by the
strategic shift from deterrence and containment to precaution and preventive
war (Weeks, 2003; Frey, 2004).3
In the health and environmental arena, impact analysis of regulatory
measures is routine. It is required in the US by Presidential Executive Order
and in the EU by the Better Regulation initiative. A similar analytic approach
should be adopted for precaution in the national security arena. The 9/11
Commission urged that the US needs ‘‘a forward-looking strategic plan
systematically analyzing assets, risks, costs, and benefits’’ of counterterrorism options (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States, 2004). Similarly, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked
the 9/11 Commission in October 2003, ‘‘Are we capturing, killing or
deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and
the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us? Does the
US need to fashion a broad, integrated plan to stop the next generation of
terrorists? The US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan,
but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The
3

For an intriguing application of economic analysis to evaluate the consequences of several
alternatives, comparing military measures to other counterterrorism strategies such as
decentralizing potential targets, recruiting potential terrorists to other opportunities, and
diffusing news media coverage of terrorist groups’ claims, see Frey (2004).
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cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists’ cost
of millions’’ (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States, 2004). Lieutenant Colonel Michael Weeks proposes that the new
National Security Strategy be accompanied by the use of concepts from
economic analysis to help make decisions. ‘‘We must make new assessments
of our capabilities and consider both direct and indirect costs [including] …
[c]ollateral damage… With precision weapons … we have the ability to put a
bomb through a particular window. What we don’t always have is the
technology to decide which window we should choose. … If we are to make
efficient decisions about where to intervene, we must be able to assess the
costs and benefits of such actions. … The primary point is that we should
make a full accounting of the elements in the equation in order to arrive at
the appropriate decision’’ (Weeks, 2003).
The purpose of evaluating the consequences is not to arrive at a precise
monetary calculus of a proposed action’s net gains or losses. Rather, it is to
ensure that decision-makers consider and do not neglect all the important
consequences of a proposed action (compared to alternative actions). It is a
cognitive exercise rather than an accounting task (Sunstein, 2001). It should
include qualitative as well as quantified impacts.
A full portfolio analysis of precaution against a risk compares the
reduction in target risk (TR) plus ancillary benefits (AB), versus the costs (C)
plus increases in countervailing risks (CR) (Wiener, 1998, 2004; Rascoff and
Revesz). Analyses should be undertaken both ex ante and ex post. Ex ante
analysis is needed to inform and shape decision-making before committing
resources, adopting policies and using force. It helps identify the potential
consequences, both intended and unintended, of various alternative actions
across various alternative scenarios. Ex post analysis is needed to adjust
actions in light of new information, and to validate and improve ex ante
analysis methods.
Such analysis can be a powerful guide to intelligent decision-making in
counterterrorism. At the same time, the case of counterterrorism can provide
a lesson for risk analysts: the need to foresee subsequent moves taken by
terrorists in response to initial counterterrorism measures. More generally,
risk analysis has too often assumed a simple direct relationship between
regulatory measures and the change in emissions or risk, neglecting
responsive behavior by the regulated actors. Risk analysis could benefit
from approaches (such as general equilibrium analysis and multi-period
games) that take account of responsive actors—actors who take evasive or
re-allocative steps in response to risk management interventions. Terrorists
clearly respond strategically to defensive measures, but this general approach
will also be useful for analyzing the effects of measures directed at adaptive
pathogens and law-abiding business firms.
In this section we present a framework for a full portfolio analysis of
precaution against terrorism. We focus on the war in Iraq as the leading
example of this strategy. Caveat: our analysis is necessarily limited to
publicly available information, so we cannot assess impacts as fully as the
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government defense and intelligence agencies could if they chose to do so,
but we can suggest a framework for analysis of the types and directions of
impacts that they might neglect if they were not put to the challenge of such
analysis. Second caveat: although we unavoidably take account of
information gleaned since the invasion (ex post), such as the apparent
absence of WMD, we also attempt to consider how an ex ante analysis
would have looked before the decision to engage in preventive war. Ex ante,
on expected value criteria, it is possible that even a low probability of WMD
existing in Iraq, combined with high damages from their use, weighed
against predictions of low cost and low countervailing risk, could have
justified precautionary action. We doubt that a careful analysis of these
impacts was made ex ante, and we suggest that had it been, the calculus
could well have shown that the decision should have been different because
the likely costs and countervailing risks were quite significant. Third caveat:
we recognize that many readers will approach this question with their minds
already made up, either for or against the war, and will accept or reject
particular aspects of our analysis so as to render the whole consonant with
their pre-existing conclusion. Nonetheless, our aim here is to persuade the
reader that a full analysis of consequences would improve decision-making
about counterterrorism, especially precautionary actions. As we have
suggested, precaution against terrorism poses a reversal of typical political
positions, and analysis of the full portfolio impacts should appeal to
thoughtful minds on all sides.
Reduction in Target Risk
Risk is a combination of probability and severity. Low probability is not by
itself a sufficient reason to neglect a risk with potentially severe
consequences (Posner, 2004); what matters is the expected value of the
risk. Ex ante, even if the probability of attack with WMD is low (e.g., 1%
per year), as long as the impact is serious (e.g., 500,000 deaths), then the
expected value of the risk is potentially large (here, 5000 deaths per year). If
the probability or the impact were higher, the expected value could rise. If
(as seems to be the case) people are more upset by a mass disaster (such as
the loss of 3000 lives on 9/11) than by the sum of the same or greater
number of individual deaths occurring separately (e.g., 40,000 automobile
accidents dispersed over time and space), then the expected utility loss from
a 1% chance of 500,000 deaths in a single attack would be even larger than
the expected utility loss from 5000 (or perhaps even 50,000) deaths
occurring individually. A ‘‘catastrophe premium’’ would need to be added.
Thus if the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq (or other precautionary
measures) would reduce the probability or impact of such an attack, they
could be justified, despite the costs and countervailing risks. Ex ante, both
wars were justified on this ground.
Ex post, the war in Afghanistan appears to have reduced the target risk
of attack by Al Qaeda (Pillar, 2004), though by how much and for how long

418 Jessica Stern & Jonathan B. Wiener
is not easy to quantify. The real actors behind the 9/11 attacks, bin Laden
and Al Qaeda, remain at large. Ex post, WMD have not been found in Iraq
(Duelfer, 2004). Whatever WMD were thought to be in Iraq either did not
exist or have escaped seizure. According to the US government’s Iraq Survey
Group, which searched for WMD capacity after the 2003 war, Iraq appears
to have ‘‘essentially destroyed’’ its WMD capacity soon after the Gulf War
of 1991 and closed its last biological weapons plant by 1996 (Duelfer,
2004). US and UK intelligence reports of WMD in Iraq just before the 2003
war now appear to have been ‘‘overstated’’ and even ‘‘dead wrong’’. The
question therefore remains whether the war in Iraq was really part of the
war against terrorism or instead a costly distraction—whether the war in
Iraq has made the world safer or less safe from terrorism. More generally,
the question is whether the shift to a precautionary counterterrorism strategy
is reducing overall risk. One could argue that even if WMD were not present
in Iraq during 1996–2003, and even if Iraq had nothing to do with the 9/11
attacks and was not supporting Al Qaeda, Iraq had future plans to acquire
WMD and had to be prevented from doing so. That is, if the probability or
severity of an attack by Iraq would be likely to grow over time (for example,
as Iraq obtained WMD or passed such weapons to terrorist groups), then an
earlier invasion could be superior to waiting and attacking later, despite
greater uncertainties. ‘‘The choice we have before us is we either go to war
now or we will never go to war with Saddam until he chooses to use a
nuclear weapon and he chooses the time and place. The question for me is
not war or no war. It’s a question of war now, when the costs may be
significant, or war later when they may be unimaginable’’, said Kenneth
Pollack (Davis et al., 2003). Acting early to forestall a growing but uncertain
risk is, as we have seen, a key tenet of the Precautionary Principle. But this
argument would authorize highly precautionary strikes against countries
with no current capacity to attack, based on conjecture about their future
plans—going far beyond the doctrine of preemptive self-defense, and amid
far greater uncertainties about the reduction in target risk to be achieved, if
any.
Osama bin Laden is still at large. Many Al Qaeda leaders may have been
captured or killed, but others may have taken their place. With no WMD yet
found in Iraq, the target risk-reduction benefit now seems much smaller than
had been anticipated before the war. The total effect—even the direction of
the effect—of the war on Al Qaeda’s capacity to inflict harm (especially with
WMD) remains highly uncertain. Perhaps we will be able to judge better in
the future as new attacks do or do not occur, but it will still be very difficult
to discern whether the rate or severity of those attacks would have been
higher or lower in the absence of the war in Iraq. It would not be implausible
to find that the war in Iraq yielded zero reduction in target risk of WMD
attack on the US or Europe. It would also not be implausible to find (based
on evidence yet to be uncovered) that it did yield some beneficial reduction
in this target risk, or on the contrary that it increased this risk.
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Ancillary Benefits
In addition to reducing the target risk, a policy intervention can also yield
other unintended benefits such as the reduction of other coincident risks
(Graham and Wiener, 1995; Wiener, 2004; Rascoff and Revesz, 2002).
Several kinds of ancillary benefits may arise from counterterrorism
measures.
Democracy and freeing the oppressed. Liberating Afghanistan and Iraq
from tyranny could help spread democracy there and in other countries. For
example, some credit these two wars with not only putting Iraq on the road
to democracy and freeing the two invaded countries from oppressive
dictatorships, but also with spurring the elections in Palestine and the
removal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Others counter that internal events,
chiefly the deaths of Yasser Arafat and Rafiq Hariri, were more important
factors in Palestine and Lebanon. They point to other countries with which
the US has collaborated since 9/11 in the fight against terror, but where
democracy is not flourishing, such as Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Egypt.
Davis et al. estimated that deposing Hussein would save 10,000–20,000
Iraqi civilian lives per year over 33 years (assuming a 3% per year chance of
the regime ending), extrapolating from a history of over 200,000 deaths
caused by the Hussein regime and sanctions against it in the decade from
1991–2002, and over 400,000 deaths in the preceding decade caused by the
Iran–Iraq war and the Iraqi campaign against the Kurds (Davis et al., 2003).
This assumes, however, that Hussein’s killings would have continued at the
same rate, and that the succeeding regime (or chaos) would cause no such
deaths.
In any case, after WMD were not found in Iraq, the goals of liberating
oppressed peoples and spreading democracy have become the Bush and Blair
administrations’ primary stated rationales for the war in Iraq (Ignatieff,
2005), even though they were not emphasized by the administrations ex ante
(at least not nearly as strongly as the WMD target risk). ‘‘[T]he example of
political pluralism in one country will be emulated’’ in other authoritarian
countries (Jervis, 2003). ‘‘Furthermore, more democracies will mean greater
stability, peaceful relations with neighbors and less terrorism’’ (Jervis, 2003).
Jervis argues that this ancillary benefit is the real justification for the war:
‘‘The war is hard to understand if the only objective was to disarm Saddam
or even remove him from power. Even had the inflated estimates of his
WMD capability been accurate, the danger was simply too remote to justify
the effort. But if changing the Iraqi regime was expected to bring democracy
and stability to the Middle East, discourage tyrants and energize reformers
throughout the world … then as part of a larger project, the war makes
sense’’ (Jervis, 2003). Similarly, Michael Ignatieff believes that the ex post
evaluation of the war in Iraq decades from now will turn on the claimed
democracy benefit: ‘‘If democracy plants itself in Iraq and spreads
throughout the Middle East, Bush will be remembered as a plain-speaking
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visionary. If Iraq fails, it will be his Vietnam, and nothing else will matter
much about his time in office’’ (Ignatieff, 2005).
That said, it remains unclear how significant this ancillary benefit will
be. The Iraqi people have been liberated from Hussein’s rule, but the
insurgency continues, and it is not clear how long democracy will be
sustainable in Iraq after US troops depart. Critics counter, among other
things, that successful democracy cannot be imposed quickly by force from
without, but requires cultivation by a domestic civil society (which in Iraq
was depleted by the economic sanctions imposed in the 1990s) (Zakaria,
2005); that human rights abuses attributed to US forces, such as at Abu
Ghraib and Guantanamo, undermine US efforts to promote democracy
and human rights in Iraq. They also argue that occupying Iraq to build
democracy is a distraction from the war on terror, ties down US troops
who would be better deployed to fight terror elsewhere, and exacerbates
terror because it is the presence of US forces in Muslim countries that will
incite terrorist attacks (Scheuer, 2004; Pape, 2005). Further, they claim
that the transition from authoritarianism to democracy is likely to cause
terrorism to increase first and decline only later (Abadie, 2004; Ignatieff,
2005).
Deterrence. Attacking and deposing governments that support terrorism
and WMD may deter other rogue states from potential violence. For
example, soon after the war in Iraq, Libya admitted its nuclear weapons
program and agreed to dismantle it. Bush administration officials credited
the change in Libya to the example of Iraq (Wortzel, 2004). Perhaps Iran
and North Korea will behave similarly (Schmitt, 2004). Others doubt that
the war in Iraq is providing the impetus for these changes. They note that
Muammar Qadafi had reportedly been trying to strike a deal since the
Clinton administration, and the deal became possible only when an
agreement was reached to make his son immune from prosecution in the
Lockerbie bombing trial. They also argue that Iran and North Korea do not
seem to be any more cooperative after the war in Iraq than before. Indeed,
the war may have induced them to rush even faster to bolster their nuclear
arsenals in order to deter a potential US strike.
Diversion. Perhaps the continuing violent insurgency in Iraq is actually a
benefit, on the theory that it represents the diversion of Islamist terrorists
away from other targets (such as the US homeland) to fighting in Iraq. The
claim is that the Islamist radicals care most about Muslim control of Muslim
countries, and less about attacking the US per se. Therefore the US invasion
of Iraq has drawn thousands of foreign fighters (and Al Qaeda leader Abu
Musab al Zarqawi) into Iraq to combat US troops, thereby diverting the
terrorists from planning attacks elsewhere. It is unclear if there is serious
evidence for this hypothesis. On the other hand, the continuing war in Iraq
may be serving as a recruiting and training ground for new jihadists who will
thereby be better equipped to attack the US and Europe in the future.
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Resilience. Hardening targets and infrastructure against terror, such as by
improving security, strengthening buildings, developing vaccines and
improving response planning, could also help shield against risks unrelated
to terrorism, such as crime, accidents, severe weather and pandemic disease.
On the other hand, counterterrorism measures could divert public and
private funding away from these purposes, undermining resilience. There
may be a tradeoff between public disclosure of risk information in order to
reduce accidents (such as at chemicals facilities, under Clean Air Act section
112(r)), and withholding of this same information in order to avoid its use
by terrorists to plan attacks.
Transportation safety. Aviation security systems could reduce highway
traffic fatalities by enhancing the perception that air travel is safe, and by
reducing the delay imposed by airport screening, both of which could
increase air travel, reduce automobile travel, and thereby reduce highway
accidents and deaths. But aviation security systems that increase delay (or
other costs) would have the opposite effect, inducing greater highway travel
and highway fatalities.
Costs
Counterterrorism policies can be costly, in both out-of-pocket expenses and
in social costs. This section focuses on financial outlays. Other adverse
impacts of the war, such as military and civilian casualties, are discussed
below in the section on Countervailing Risks.
Out of pocket expenses are significant. Between 2001 and 2004, the US
budget for defense plus homeland security rose 50%, from $354 billion to
$547 billion (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States, 2004). By contrast, as a union, EU members spend more than J160
billion on defense. Ex ante, the Bush administration was reluctant to name a
number, but appeared to predict costs for the war in Iraq of under $100
billion (former economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey was evidently fired for
stating publicly that the costs would be between $100 and $200 billion). Ex
post, so far, the war in Iraq has cost the US federal budget well over $150
billion. The costs have escalated as the insurgency has continued, more than
a year after President Bush declared major military operations over while
speaking in front of a banner reading ‘‘Mission Accomplished’’.
Before the war in Iraq, some economists attempted to estimate the full
social costs. After reviewing preliminary studies by the House Budget
Committee, the Congressional Budget Office and estimates from other major
wars in US history, William Nordhaus developed the estimates in Figure 1,
per decade (in billions of 2002 dollars).
Nordhaus’s estimates ranged from about $100 billion per decade in the
‘‘low’’ case (short war) to about $2 trillion per decade in the ‘‘high’’ case
(which assumes that ‘‘the war drags on, occupation is lengthy, nationbuilding is costly, the war destroys a large part of Iraq’s oil infrastructure,
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Figure 1. Costs of the Iraq War: Nordhaus estimates (Norhaus, 2002)

Source of Cost
Direct military spending
Follow-on costs
Occupation and peacekeeping
Reconstruction and nation-building
Humanitarian assistance
Impact on oil markets
Macroeconomic impact
Total

Low scenario
(short and
favorable war)

High scenario
(protracted and
unfavorable war)

Notes

$50

$140

[a]

75
30
1
-40
-17
$99

500
105
10
778
391
$1924

[b]
[c]
[d]
[e]
[f]

Notes:
[a] Protracted conflict assumes that the monthly cost is 50% greater than the CBO estimate
and that the conflict lasts eight months or longer.
[b] The low and high numbers assume, respectively, peacekeeper costs of $200,000—250,000
per peacekeeper per year, with the numbers from 75,000 to 200,000, and for periods of 5—
10 years.
[c] This includes, at the low end, reconstruction costs of $30 billion and minimal nationbuilding costs. At the high end, it adds a ‘‘Marshall Plan for Iraq’’ as described in the text.
[d] These estimates refer to a full-employment economy. The high estimate is based on Perry’s
‘‘worse’’ or middle case, which assumes a production decline of 7 million bpd offset by
withdrawals from reserves of 2.5 million bpd. The ‘‘happy’’ case assumes that OPEC
increases production by 0.67 million bpd in the five years after the end of hostilities and that
production stays at the higher level. The sign is negative to indicate a benefit or negative cost.
[e] The macroeconomic impact excludes the full-employment impacts in [4] and includes only
the first two years of a cyclical impact.
[f] These costs are the total for the decade following the conflict (e.g., 2003–2012). Negative
numbers are benefits.

there is lingering military and political resistance in the Islamic world to US
occupation, and there are major adverse psychological reactions to the
conflict)’’ (Nordhaus, 2002). Nordhaus was quick to agree that these two
scenarios are not the only possible outcomes; they were offered to sketch the
range of plausible costs.
The actual direct spending on the war may now exceed Nordhaus’s
estimates. Combining military, occupation, reconstruction, and humanitarian spending, Nordhaus estimated direct expenses ranging from $156 billion
to $745 billion per decade. But the total of such expenses from the beginning
of the war in March 2003 through June 2005 (just over two years) is already
over $150 billion.
The effect of the war on the price of oil was a major component of both
of Nordhaus’ scenarios, accounting for almost half the net costs in each case.
Nordhaus put the cost of oil in 2004 at about $25 per barrel in the low
scenario and about $65 per barrel in the high scenario (drawing on work by
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George Perry) (Nordhaus, 2002). In fact, the price of oil in August 2004 was
about $40–45 per barrel, about halfway between Nordhaus’ low scenario
and his high scenario. By June 2005 the price had reached about $60 per
barrel. If this price increase is mostly due to the war in Iraq, then on
Nordhaus’s range of estimates it implies costs of at least $200 billion or
$300 billion per decade (at least halfway between the savings of $40 billion
and costs of $778 billion he forecast) in impacts on oil markets, and perhaps
more in macroeconomic impacts.
A key uncertainty in Nordhaus’s estimate is the duration of the
occupation of Iraq and the intensity of the insurgency. The longer and
more intense, the higher the costs. Ex ante, on February 7, 2003, Secretary
Rumsfeld predicted the war would last between six days and six months. By
June 26, 2005, he said the insurgency might last up to 12 years. Further,
Nordhaus did not count the cost of military or civilian casualties due to the
war. Nordhaus also emphasized that most ex ante estimates of the costs of
war usually underestimate the actual costs (Nordhaus, 2002). Meanwhile,
Nordhaus’ study did not attempt to quantify or compare the benefits of the
war.
Davis et al. attempted a cost-benefit analysis of going to war in Iraq,
compared to a policy of containment of Iraq with Hussein still in power.
Their estimates are outlined in Figure 2.
On this basis, Davis et al. argued that the war would yield substantial net
benefits, both to the US and to the Iraqi people, and both in financial and
human terms. Note that the Davis et al. calculation did not include the
ancillary benefits of spreading democracy elsewhere, or of deterring other
rogue states. Nor did it even include the target risk reduction benefit of
seizing Iraqi WMD—it counted only the avoided risk of additional lowtechnology terror attacks similar to 9/11. On the other hand, the Davis et al.
estimate counted only out-of-pocket costs and did not appear to account for
the effect of the war on oil prices and macroeconomic performance, which
were the two largest items in Nordhaus’s cost estimate. Nor did Davis et al.
include the countervailing risks, which could increase the risk to the US of
new terror attacks.
A more recent study by Wallsten and Kosec conducts a mid-course
benefit-cost evaluation of the war in Iraq (see Figure 3).
They find that Davis et al. overstated the net benefits of the war. Wallsten
and Kosec find that the direct costs of the Iraq war have exceeded the direct
benefits by about a factor of two. They include both military expenditures and
lives lost in the costs, and they include both the avoided costs of containing
Saddam and the lives saved from the Saddam regime in the benefits. Wallsten
and Kosec did not quantify such other factors as the effect of the war on the
risk of terrorist attack, the effect of democracy (or chaos) in Iraq, the deterrent
effect on other rogue states (e.g. Libya, Iran, North Korea), the bogging down
of US military in Iraq, or the effect of the war on oil prices and
macroeconomy. It is not simple to compare these figures with those in
Davis et al. (Figure 2) because they cover different time periods and different
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Figure 2. Costs and benefits of the Iraq War: Davis et al. estimates (Davis et al., 2003)
30 years, 2003–2036 (US
$billions)

Costs
avoided

Costs incurred

US & Coalition
Expenses
Fatalities
(,5000)
Homeland security expense
Another 9/11 attack damages
Iraq
Fatalities
(,30,000)
Subtotals
+ 35,000
lives lost
Total

125
32.5

Notes

380
[a]
200
50

105
125
137.5

262.5

(,200,000
or more)
+
200,000+
lives saved

700+

[a]

630
700+

[a]

1330+

[b], [c]

Notes:
[a] Davis et al. did not monetize fatalities. For consistent comparison, these figures follow
Wallsten and Kosec (2005), assuming US VSL 5 $6.5m, Iraq VSL 5 $3.5 m (based on income
elasticity of VSL 5 2.55).
[b] Unclear if Davis et al. discounted to NPV.
[c] Omits: Macroeconomic (oil) costs, increased p(Terrorism), other CRs & ABs.

types of impacts. For example, Davis et al. forecast $125 billion in expenses
and 35,000 deaths due to the war, which looks similar to the estimates in the
Wallsten and Kosec analysis ($268 billion and 32,000 deaths), except that
Davis et al. were forecasting these $125 billion and 35,000 deaths to occur
over 30 years, whereas Wallsten and Kosec are reporting that these amounts
have already occurred in just the first two to three years of the war. On a
comparable basis of costs and benefits per year, the benefits numbers are
similar at about $30–50 billion/year (largely because Wallsten and Kosec used
Davis et al.’s forecast of 10,000 Iraqi deaths per year prevented by dethroning
Saddam, although Wallsten and Kosec omit any number for the risk of future
terrorism prevented whereas Davis et al. add $50 billion for preventing
another 9/11 type attack); but the costs estimates are quite different because
Davis et al. appear to have underestimated the costs at only about $4 billion/
year ($124 billion/30 years) and 1000 deaths/year (35,000/30 years). Both
studies omitted any estimate of the increased risk of terrorism due to the war,
or numerous other ancillary risks we identify here.
Increase in Countervailing Risks
All risk management measures—whether to protect the world from toxics
or terrorism—can have the perverse effect of increasing other risks and,
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Figure 3. Costs and benefits of the war: Wallsten and Kosec (2005) estimates
2003-2005 (US $billions, ‘‘Mid’’-estimate)
Costs incurred
US
Expenses
Fatalities
Injuries
Lost work
Other Coalition
Expenses
Fatalities
Injuries
Iraq
Expenses
Fatalities
Injuries
Total

(,2000)
(,14,000)

212
14
18
10

(,237)

36
1
2

(,30,000)

20
106
8
428

Costs avoided

Notes

32
[a]
[a]

[a]
[a]

(,24,000)

85

[a]
[a]

116

[b]

(Extrapolate same rates over 2005--2015: costs incurred $576b, costs avoided $313b.)
Notes:
[a] Assumes US VSL 5 $6.5m, Iraq VSL 5 $3.5m (based on income elasticity of VSL 50.55).
Injuries weighted by severity. Combines military and civilian casualties at same VSL. 5%
discount rate.
[b] Omits: Macroeconomic (oil) costs, Influence on p(Terrorism), other CRs & ABs.

potentially, of creating a more dangerous world (Wiener, 1998; Stern,
2003b). There can be real risks to precaution, whether military or
regulatory, but health and safety risks as well. Such ‘‘risk-risk tradeoffs’’
are pervasive in human decision-making (Graham and Wiener, 1995).
Graham and Wiener argue that decision-makers should evaluate the
expected consequences and weigh the tradeoffs; and they should seek
‘‘risk-superior’’ strategies that reduce multiple risks in concert rather than
trading one risk for another.
The use of foreign policy and military force to reduce risks such as
terrorism and WMD is not immune to risk–risk tradeoffs (Stern, 2002).
Indeed, the history of warfare is replete with instances in which military
strategies proved ineffectual or worse, counterproductive—what Barbara
Tuchman has called the ‘‘March of Folly’’ (Tuchman, 1984). Military
intervention can fail or backfire. Even when military actions succeed in their
operational aims, they typically cause some ‘‘collateral damage’’ to civilians.
Consider a few examples: raiding buildings where terrorists have taken
hostages can kill both combatants and hostages, as occurred in the Moscow
theater in 2002 and at the school in Beslan, Russia in September 2004.
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Bombing terrorist camps and military facilities, even with precision-guided
munitions, can kill nearby civilians. Giving airline pilots guns to stop
terrorists may lead to in-flight accidents, theft or misuse. Restrictions on
suspected terrorists’ access to the country can also impinge on innocent
immigrants’ civil liberties (Keeney, 2001). Controlling access to information
on pathogens and materials to prevent bioterrorism can increase the impact
of natural disease outbreaks (Stern, 2003).
Moreover, terrorism is a dynamic strategic risk. Because terrorists are
strategic actors who respond to countermeasures, assessing the full
consequences of a counterterrorism strategy must include attention to such
responses. For example, hardening some targets against attack (if such
defenses are observable) can induce terrorists to shift their attacks to other
targets (Lakdawala and Zanjani, 2002; Keohane and Zekhauser, 2002;
Clotfelter, 1978). Military strikes against terrorist camps can incur reprisals
by those attacked and ‘‘blow-back’’ by spurring the recruitment of even
more terrorists (Johnson, 2004). Historically, there is reason to believe that
counterterrorism measures have influenced terrorists to change their tactics.
When metal detectors were installed at airports, terrorists found other ways
to attack planes. When governments protected embassies with concrete
barriers, terrorists turned to larger explosives. The attack on multiple trains
in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005 may reflect terrorists’
understanding that airplanes were by then relatively harder targets. In
another setting, when governments begin profiling a particular type of
suspect, terrorists may recruit another type. For example, airline screening
for particular passenger attributes may yield false negatives as terrorists
deploy operatives selected to evade the profile (or switch to other targets
such as trains or ports), and also false positives that snare innocent travelers
and condition inspectors to relax their vigilance. Similarly, the official
profile of a typical terrorist developed by the US Department of Homeland
Security to scrutinize visa applicants and resident aliens applies only to men.
That profile was developed before the advent of Islamist chat rooms
recruiting operatives for a global jihad, before the war in Iraq increased antiUS sentiment worldwide, and before women started serving as suicide
bombers for Islamist terrorist organizations (and before the summer 2004
bombings by ‘‘Black Widow’’ female terrorists from Chechnya). The lack of
scrutiny of women entering the US, and the significantly greater focus on
men from Islamic countries, may lead Al Qaeda to turn increasingly to
women and other recruits who do not fit the standard profile of a Middle
Eastern male. According to intelligence assessments cited in the press, the Al
Qaeda movement is seeking recruits all over the world—in Western prisons
and inner cities, among Hispanic Americans and among French converts to
Islam. Through Internet communications, it is urging individuals to create
their own cells and carry out their own strikes, without necessarily joining
existing militant organizations. And it is recruiting women (Stern, 2003).
Policy advocates, and the risk analyses they conduct, too often assume a
simple one-way relationship between policy interventions and the resulting
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change in risk, neglecting responsive behavior by the regulated actors. But
risk analysis should be addressing a broader spectrum, from stochastic risks
whose sources do not react to preventive measures (e.g., earthquakes and
asteroids), to dynamic risks whose sources are strategic or responsive risk
agents who attempt to circumvent or retaliate against preventive measures
(e.g., pathogens, terrorists and pollution in the longer term as even lawabiding firms react strategically to regulations).
In short, every protective intervention—military, regulatory or medical—also runs the risk of causing new harms. Precautionary regulation can
transfer risks to new populations, substitute new risks for old ones in the
same population, or both (Graham and Wiener, 1995). Assessing the impact
of regulatory action requires a holistic assessment of the multi-risk portfolio
affected by each intervention (Wiener, 2004). These are the same questions
to ask about both regulatory policies and counterterrorism actions alike. A
consistent approach to precaution and government power requires attention
to the countervailing risks of both environmental regulation and counterterrorism.
One avowed purpose of the Precautionary Principle is to empower
government to be able to intervene before risks become catastrophes
(Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994). Analysis of risk–risk tradeoffs is a sensible
check on excessive precaution and on excessive or narrow-minded exercise
of government power (Wiener, 2002). When precaution is invoked by
government to wage war against terrorism, that too may pose countervailing
risks, and analysis of risk–risk tradeoffs is again the sensible response to
check excessive or narrow-minded exercise of government power—in this
case, immense power. Liberals who dislike force and aggression, and
conservatives who are suspicious of government power, should both agree
on the need for risk–risk tradeoff analysis in either of these cases.
It is crucial to recognize that there can be countervailing risks of
counterterrorism policies even if the claims about WMD and other terrorist
activities were true positive forecasts. The issue is the expected consequences
of the policy choice, not just the existence of the target risk. It is an error to
assume, as the media and the public and many experts seem to do, that the
question to be answered is only whether the risk is ‘‘real’’ or not, i.e. whether
there are WMD in Iraq (or an Iraq–Al Qaeda link). The assumption behind
this posture is that if the answer is no (false positive), intervention is
unwarranted, but if the answer is yes (true positive), intervention is
warranted. But because there are also costs and countervailing risks of
intervening, even a true positive is not sufficient to warrant intervention.
Intervention must still be evaluated in terms of its overall risk consequences.
At the same time, a definitive true positive is also not necessary to warrant
intervention: even if the answer is ‘‘we’re not sure’’ (uncertainty), there can
still be a warrant for intervention, because the uncertainty-weighted
(expected value) risk reduction to be gained from the intervention might
still be large enough to outweigh its costs and countervailing risks.
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The same error is made regarding environmental risks such as climate
change: the public debate and some expert debate is fixated on whether
global warming is ‘‘real’’ or not, when decision analysis teaches that even an
uncertain risk could warrant precaution (true positive not necessary), and
also that even a highly certain risk might not warrant precaution, if the costs
and countervailing risks are too large relative to the effectiveness of the
policy (true positive not sufficient). The issue is the expected consequences of
the policy choice, not the reality or improbability of the target risk.
The war in Iraq could increase a variety of countervailing risks. Here we
identify several.
Collateral damage: civilian deaths. Data on civilian and military deaths in
war are not easy to find, and those data that are available may be disputed or
unreliable. In Figure 4 we have collected the available range of estimates for
several wars involving the US during the past century.
In the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, ex ante, US officials predicted that US
troops would be greeted as liberators and the wars could last days. Ex post,
these two wars have lasted longer and have killed thousands so far, including
about 2,000 US soldiers combined. The US and UK militaries have not kept,
or have not disclosed,counts of civilian deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Private analysts have attempted to keep such data. Through May 2003,
civilian deaths from the war in Afghanistan were roughly 3300, with the vast
majority occurring in the first four months of war October 2001 to February
2002, according to an accounting by University of New Hampshire
economist Marc Herold. From March 2003 through June 2005, civilian
deaths from the Iraq war were roughly 24,000, according to the website
http://www.iraqbodycount.net/ maintained by independent researchers
drawing on Herold’s methodology. But an estimate by public health
researchers from John Hopkins University and their colleagues, based on
surveys of a sample of households in Iraq and published in the peer-reviewed
medical journal The Lancet, estimated that the number of civilian deaths
resulting from the Iraq war (through October 2004, principally due to air
strikes) was closer to 100,000 or more (Roberts et al., 2004).
At the same time, the extent of collateral damage caused by US forces
appears to be declining over time, probably because of increased use of
precision weapons technologies. As indicated in Figure 4, the ratio of civilian
deaths per US military death appears to have steadily declined, from 43 to
111 in World War I, 75 in World War II, 14 to 69 in Vietnam, 17 in
Afghanistan and 13 in the Iraq War (using the lower figure of 24,000 civilian
deaths), but it may have increased to 53 (using the higher figure of 100,000
civilian deaths). The possible increase in the ratio in the Iraq war, despite
precision weapons, may be associated with more air strikes occurring in
densely populated urban areas. (The outlier figure of 471 civilian deaths per
US military death in the 1991 Gulf War is the result of the very small number
of US military deaths and the roughly 125,000 deaths due to the post-war
chaos within Iraq, for which causation is difficult to attribute; omitting those

Figure 4. Deaths in selected wars (compiled from the sources indicated by Wiener and Cromer)
War and year
started

Total military

Civilian

Civilian/US
military

Civilian/total
military

Iraq – 2003

1978 plus 199 other
coalition

,5000–6400

,7000–8400

26,568–29,922a or
100,000b

,13–,52

,3–,12.5

Afghanistan –
2001

192c

?

?

3300d

,17

?

Gulf War –
1991

293e

,35,000f–
40,000g

,40,000

13,000 directly plus
,125,000h

,471

,3.5

Vietnam –
1962

58,168i plus 223,748
South Vietnamese and
5,282 otherj

1,100,000k

1,387,198

4,000,000 (2 million
each in North and
South)l

,69 (US only); ,3
, 14 (US + SV)

World War II – 407,316 (292,131 in
1939
combat plus 115,185
other)m

5,466,000n

23,289,000o

30,755,000p

,75

,1.3

World War I –
1914

,3,200,000–
5,600,000r

8,538,315s or
8,364,712–
12,599,000t

,5,000,000–
13,000,000u

,43–111

,0.4–1.6

116,708 (53,513 in
combat plus 63,195
other)q

From http://www.iraqbodycount.net accessed October 18, 2005.
Les Roberts et al., ‘‘Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster sample survey,’’ 364 The Lancet 1857-1864, Oct. 29, 2004,
available at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140673604174412/fulltext .
c
From http://www.antiwar.com/casualties accessed June 27, 2005.
d
From http://pubpages.unh.edu/,mwherold/ accessed June 27, 2005.
b
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Enemy
military

US military

e

Al Nofi, ‘‘Statistical Summary: America’s Major Wars,’’ last modified June 13, 2001, at http://www.cwc.lsu.edu/cwc/other/stats/warcost.htm,
accessed June 27, 2005 (based on ‘‘Principal Wars in which the US Participated: US Military Personnel Serving and Casualties,’’ Washington
Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, US Department of Defense Records, Tables 2–23).
f
Pollack, K. (2002) The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq, p. 139 (New York: Random House).
g
From http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/feb2003/nf2003026_0167_db052.htm, accessed June 27, 2005.
h
From http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/feb2003/nf2003026_0167_db052.htm accessed June 27, 2005. The ,125,000 are postwar deaths were due to destruction of the country’s infrastructure, water, electricity, and health care. The ,138,000 civilians do not include
30,000 Kurdish and Shiite rebels killed by Saddam Hussein.
i
Nofi, supra. See also http://www.eiis.net/cmart/vietwarstats.html (counting 58,202).
j
From http://www.rjsmith.com/kia_tbl.html , accessed June 27, 2005.
k
From http://www.rjsmith.com/kia_tbl.html , accessed June 27, 2005.
l
From http://www.rjsmith.com/kia_tbl.html , accessed June 27, 2005.
m
Nofi, supra. Combat deaths include troops killed in action or dead of wounds. Other includes deaths from disease, privation, accidents, and
losses among prisoners of war. Figures do not include deaths of other Allied forces.
n
Geoff Price, ‘‘Casualties of War—Putting American Casualties in Perspective’’, November 3, 2003, at http://www.rationalrevolution.net/
articles/casualties_of_war.htm , accessed June 27, 2005.
o
Price, supra. Here Price appears to count only combat deaths, not others due to disease, privation, accidents, etc. (at least for the US, for which
he counts 295,000 military deaths).
p
Price, supra.
q
Nofi, supra. Price, supra, counts 126,000; here Price appears to count both combat and other deaths. Figures do not include deaths of other
Allied forces.
r
From http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat1.htm accessed June 27, 2005.
s
Price, supra.
t
From http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat1.htm accessed June 27, 2005.
u
From http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat1.htm accessed June 27, 2005.
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Figure 4. Continued
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125,000 would yield a ratio of 44, in line with the declining trend from
World War I through the Iraq War.) Some observers agree that precision
weaponry is shielding civilians:
‘If you talk to the Red Cross or most other observers, you’ll find that [US
forces] did a rather good job of avoiding or minimizing collateral damage’ in
both Iraq and Afghanistan, says Robert Goldman, who specializes in human
rights and armed conflict at American University’s Washington College of
Law. (Civilian casualties in Afghanistan are as difficult to calculate as those in
Iraq.) This was not the case in previous wars. In World War II, tens of
thousands of civilians were killed in single attacks. Mussolini terror-bombed
Ethiopia; Nazi Germany indiscriminately bombed London; and the Allies
firebombed Dresden and other German cities. Tokyo was firebombed, and the
US dropped atom bombs on two Japanese cities. ‘We’ve certainly changed our
practices since World War II—everyone has—where the cities themselves were
seen as targets’, says Prof. Goldman. Yet, in some ways, civilian casualties
increasingly have become part of war—certainly part of the Pentagon’s
planning for what’s called ‘asymmetrical war’ fought against terrorist cells,
insurgencies and stateless organizations like Al Qaeda. (Knickerboacker,
2004)

It is interesting to note, however, that the ratio of civilian deaths to total
military deaths (the last column in Figure 4) appears not to have declined at
all over time (remaining at about three), and may even be rising. The ratio of
total military deaths to US military deaths fell from 85 in WWI (where the
US entered the war long after the other great powers) to 57 in WWII (where
much of the bloodiest fighting was between countries other than the US) to
24 in Vietnam, then rose to 137 in the Gulf War (where US casualties were
very low), and then fell to four in Iraq.
Blow-back: increased terrorism. The invasion and occupation of Iraq
could increase terrorist recruiting—as feared by Secretary Rumsfeld, quoted
above—by causing anger and humiliation among a wide swath of the Iraqi
people and Muslims generally. The idea (accurate or not) that the US is
engaged in a crusade against the Islamic world is a critical component of the
Islamist nihilists’ worldview, and spreading this idea is critical to their
success. The unprovoked attack on Iraq, not aimed at Al Qaeda and
followed by the US occupation of a Muslim country, accompanied by
occasional religious rhetoric from US generals and officials about a
‘‘crusade’’ to ‘‘rid the world of evil’’, may give credence to this view and
increase the flow of recruits to radical Islamist terror cells (Pillar, 2004).
Many advocates of the war on terrorism have criticized the invasion of Iraq
as likely to strengthen terrorism by expanding the ranks of new recruits to Al
Qaeda, such as Pillar (2004), Michael Scheuer (2004), James Fallows (2004),
Richard Clarke (2004), Joseph Cirincione et al. (2004) and Christopher
Adams (2004). Cirincione et al. state: ‘‘It was almost inevitable that a US
victory would add to the sense of cultural, ethnic and religious humiliation
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that is known to be a prime motivator of Al Qaeda-type terrorists. It was
widely predicted by experts beforehand that the war would boost
recruitment to this network…’’ (Cirincione et al., 2004). It it worth noting
that there is no weakness or disloyalty in recognizing that an aggressive
precautionary stance may be counterproductive. As Tuchman observes,
refusing to recognize such consequences is classic military folly (Tuchman,
1984). It is more loyal to our troops and the nation to deploy our forces
effectively, not perversely. Israel, staunchly anti-terrorist, recently chose to
end its own practice of demolishing the homes of Palestinian militants’
relatives because Israeli analysts found that this policy inspired more
terrorism, not less (Myre, 2005).
The flow of new terrorist recruits depends on motivations that
counterterrorism policy can influence. A key factor appears to be the sense
of humiliation among Muslim men (Hutchings, 2004). The purpose of
fighting the new world order and US imperialism, in the view of Zawahiri,
bin Laden’s second in command, is to restore the dignity of humiliated
youth. This idea is similar to Franz Fanon’s radical claim that violence is a
‘‘cleansing force’’ that frees the oppressed youth from his ‘‘inferiority
complex, despair and inaction’’, making him fearless and restoring his selfrespect (Fanon, 1961). It is in the context of these kinds of radical beliefs
that the war in Iraq, and the horrific images of US soldiers humiliating and
torturing Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib or the allegations of US interrogators
desecrating the Koran at Guantanamo, may be so inflammatory and
counterproductive.
Many observers of diverse political stripes worry about the impact of the
war on support for the US in the Islamic world. ‘‘Listening to the
neoconservatives, Bush invaded Iraq, united the Arab world against us,
isolated us from Europe and fulfilled to the letter bin Laden’s prophecy as to
what we were about. We won the war in three weeks—and we may have lost
the Islamic world for a generation’’, Pat Buchanan (2004) warned. Former
Vice President Gore has made the same argument (Gore, 2004).
Intelligence agencies warn that the war was used to good effect by Al
Qaeda in increasing its recruitment of new members. Pillar argues that the
invasion has also made the terror network harder to combat by dispersing it
worldwide, and that the capture or killing of bin Laden will spark an ecstatic
popular reaction followed by relaxation, while the terror network will
continue to spread and subdivide unabated (Pillar, 2004). In the near term,
Europeans and Asians are more likely to suffer the consequences because, for
reasons not yet fully understood (perhaps relating to the degree or lack of
success and assimilation in mainstream society), a greater proportion of
Muslims in Europe and Asia are joining the global jihadi movement, and
those groups are attacking Europe and Asia, not the US, at least for now.
Moreover, the presence of foreign occupying troops has been identified as an
important motivating factor in recruiting suicide bombers (in both secular
and religious movements) against the occupier’s troops and home country
(Pape, 2005; Bloom, 2005).
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Shackling US military capacity. The invasion and occupation of Iraq,
particularly because it is lasting so much longer than predicted ex ante, may
impinge on US military capabilities and thus reduce US capacity to combat
terrorism and other threats:

N

N

N
N

N

N

Distraction from greater threats. The extended attention and resource
commitment to Iraq may be distracting the US from Al Qaeda in other
countries such as Afghanistan, and from other rogue states, such as Iran
and North Korea, that are much closer to deploying WMD than Iraq was
(Fallows, 2004). As the US gets bogged down in Iraq (which proved not to
have WMD), it may be forfeiting the ability to address the target risk of
WMD where it really exists, such as in Iran and North Korea and perhaps
elsewhere.
Reduced recruiting. The extended war in Iraq, and policies, such as ‘‘stoploss’’ to prevent soldiers from returning home after their originally-agreed
service duty is completed, are sharply reducing US Army recruiting rates
(Schmitt, 2005). This deficit may undermine the ability of the US to fight
the next (more important) war.
Emboldened adversaries. The war may be showing the insurgents and the
world that the superpower US military can be held at bay for months,
thereby inspiring additional groups to be confrontational.
Under-reaction next time. The belief (accurate or not) that US and UK
claims of WMD in Iraq were a false positive, or ‘‘crying wolf’’, may lead
other countries to disbelieve the US and UK the next time they assert a
WMD threat. Yet the next time may be tragically true (just as the wolf
ultimately ate the sheep when no one would believe the boy). The present
false positive and over-reaction may yield a future under-reaction, thereby
incurring just the risk of a WMD attack on the US or Europe that the
precautionary Bush administration strategy is intended to prevent.
Dividing NATO. The war in Iraq has divided the NATO alliance, at least
temporarily. The US, UK, Poland, Italy and Spain joined the war, but
France, Germany, Russia and others opposed it. Spain later switched
parties and withdrew. If the Western alliance remains divided, that may
do more to undermine future ability to combat terrorism and WMD than
the war in Iraq has done (if any) to advance that goal.
Tempting others to preempt. The UN’s High-Level Panel in 2004 argued
that authorizing unilateral preventive war is an invitation for all to do so.
Setting the precedent of unilateral preventive war may induce fear of
surprise attack, tempting others to attack first lest they be attacked. The
result may be more frequent wars among other states, some of which
entangle the US, and the possibility that a country like North Korea might
strike the US first, not expecting strategic victory, but in the hopes of
decapitating the US government. The Brookings Institute wrote that
preemptive war ‘‘[s]trategy fails to acknowledge that a preemptive attack
could precipitate the very attacks it seeks to prevent. An obvious danger is
that the rogue state will use its weapons of mass destruction before it loses
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them—or deliberately give them to a group that will’’ (Daalder et al.,
2002).
Each of these is a serious problem; taken together they suggest that, even
if the war in Iraq has not increased terrorist recruiting rates or otherwise
assisted terrorists, it may have increased the future risk to the US and Europe
of a successful terrorist attack with WMD.
Dissemination of WMD and weapons-usable materials. One of the gravest
countervailing dangers in going to war in Iraq was the risk that WMD
materials and expertise would be disseminated rather than destroyed.
Indeed, attacking Iraq, without protecting its borders, may well have made it
more likely that WMD components and expertise would end up in the hands
of terrorists. Ironically, this countervailing danger would be higher if Iraq
really did possess the WMD that the Bush and Blair administrations argued
it had and if Hussein really were prepared to share his WMD with terrorists.
Although these assertions now appear to have been false, some
dissemination of materials and expertise appears to have occurred. The
buildup to the US/UK invasion took several months, allowing ample time to
hide or relocate WMD. After the war, no WMD were found, but Iraqi
authorities informed the IAEA that 380 tons of high explosives under IAEA
seal had been stolen—explosives that the IAEA had specifically warned the
US to guard, apparently in vain (Glanz et al., 2004). The IAEA reported to
the UN Security Council that satellite imagery has shown many instances of
the dismantlement of entire buildings that housed precision equipment as
well as the removal of equipment and materials. Biological materials may
have been stolen as well, according to a report co-authored by Jessica
Matthews, who visited Iraq to investigate; enough material to produce a
‘‘dirty bomb’’ was stolen (Cirincione et al., 2004). Once scientists know how
to grow and disseminate biological agents effectively, new stockpiles can be
rapidly rebuilt. Perhaps some of Hussein’s weaponeers, displaced or
disaffected by the invasion and overthrow, provided their expertise to our
terrorist enemies.
Moreover, the strategy of preemption (or preventive war) could itself
induce rogue states to use or pass on their nascent WMD. ‘‘An obvious
danger is that the rogue state will … deliberately give [its WMD] to groups
that will [use them]. A less obvious danger is that terrorists will be able to
use the chaos that accompanies war to buy or steal weapons of mass
destruction’’, according to scholars at the Brookings Institution (Daalder
et al., 2004).
Applying Risk Analysis to Counterterrorism: a New Institutional
Mechanism
The shift in national security strategy, from containment to preemption of
imminent threats to precaution against uncertain future threats (preventive
war), emphasizes the need for ex ante full portfolio analysis of risks, benefits
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and costs. Precaution is a highly risky strategy because it strikes first, while
the target risk is highly uncertain, and thus may strike the wrong target (a
false positive) or create countervailing risks, or both (Wiener, 2002;
Sunstein, 2005). A primary lesson learned in the regulation of health and
environmental risks is that all risk management interventions, and especially
precautionary measures, need to be evaluated with ex ante analysis of risks,
benefits and costs to avoid serious policy errors (Breyer, 1993), and
supplemented with ex post review to adjust policy in light of updated
information and to validate the ex ante estimates. The Bush administration’s
chief regulatory official, former Harvard professor John D. Graham, has
been an outspoken and effective advocate of rigorous review of the risks,
benefits and costs of proposed regulations, and a critic of the Precautionary
Principle (Graham, 2001, 2004).
Ex ante risk analyses often overstate, understate or omit key factors. Ex
post analyses can be useful for identifying such errors and thus improving
the framework used for future ex ante analyses. As detailed above, before
the war in Iraq, the US and UK government estimates overstated the target
risk reduction benefits from disarming supposed Iraqi WMD, understated
the costs, omitted important countervailing risks and (later) switched to
ancillary benefits to justify the war (such as removing Hussein and
democratizing Iraq and the Middle East). Private experts’ ex ante estimates
also erred: Nordhaus omitted benefits and key countervailing risks, and
Davis et al. omitted some benefits, some costs and key countervailing risks.
We have compiled an ex post risk analysis of the war in Iraq that attempts to
furnish a more complete set of factors to consider and weigh, and offers a
basis for evaluating the ex ante analyses. Therefore, we argue that better
ex ante analysis of counterterrorism requires a more systematic approach to
full portfolio risk analysis, and the creation of a new risk analysis function
for the US and other governments to undertake and review such analyses.
The same analytic approach applied to other precautionary health
protection interventions should be applied to such measures to reduce the
risk of terrorism. Advocates of risk analysis in the regulatory arena should
immediately see its value in shaping smarter counterterrorism policies,
avoiding mistakes and perverse results, and allocating scarce resources
efficiently. Indeed, it is particularly the conservative advocates of risk and
cost-benefit analysis as a check on government power who should see its
need in the counterterrorism arena, even as they champion the war on
terrorism. Meanwhile, critics of risk analysis in the health and environmental regulatory arena should see that its application to counterterrorism
measures would be a valuable expansion of risk analysis to apply more
evenhandedly across all government operations (rather than being a special
check on health and environmental policies alone). They may also see it as
supportive of their own concerns about precautionary counterterrorism
actions, such as the war in Iraq.
The primary objection to ex ante risk analysis of precautionary
counterterrorism measures will come from advocates of preventive war in
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the age of non-state actors wielding WMD. These advocates, including those
who adopted the new US National Security Strategy in 2002 and steered the
preventive war in Iraq, will fear that such analysis will delay required actions
that must be taken quickly. This is, of course, precisely the same objection
made by advocates of precaution in the health and environmental arena: that
risks are upon us, delay is fatal, and ex ante review means ‘‘paralysis by
analysis’’. The same answers can be given to respond to both concerns. First,
if the analysis improves the decision and thereby avoids major mistakes,
costs, countervailing risks and perverse folly, the analysis will be highly
worthwhile. The entire point is that hasty precaution can be worse than
waiting to analyze the problem more fully. Second, by improving the policy
choice, the analysis can actually save time down the line, when a poorly
designed policy would be overhauled or even abandoned in light of its costly
or perverse consequences and the attendant public disaffection or backlash.
The absence of WMD in Iraq, the seemingly endless insurgency bogging
down US forces and diverting our attention from more urgent risks in Iran
and North Korea, and the increasing disapproval by the US public of the war
in Iraq are illustrative (The Economist, 2005); better ex ante analysis might
have avoided this trap. Third, analysis can be accelerated and streamlined to
frame decisions more quickly, while still performing the cognitive framing
function that helps avoid neglect of important consequences. It can even be
undertaken in advance, of multiple hypothetical situations and scenarios,
and then updated quickly when the actual need arises. Fourth, the war in
Iraq was not undertaken instantly; indeed the Bush and Blair administrations
are at pains to insist that they took months to attempt diplomacy and UN
resolutions before deciding on war as a last resort, so there would clearly
have been time for a more systematic risk analysis in at least that case. Fifth,
it is true that excessive analysis could mean unwarranted delay, but this too
should be subject to a balancing test: additional analysis should be
undertaken where its benefits in improved policy outweigh its costs in
delaying reduction of the target risk, and not where the reverse is true. Thus,
requirements for analysis should be stronger where the consequences of
error are higher, and streamlined where the decision is more urgent.
A different objection will be that not all consequences of counterterrorism measures can be quantified or monetized. Deaths and injuries to
soldiers and civilians can be counted, but monetizing them is more
controversial. Restrictions on privacy and mobility may be harder to
quantify. Probabilities and responsive strategies may be difficult to calculate.
The same kinds of questions arise during analysis of health and
environmental regulations. As Weeks notes, in the military context (as in
the environmental context), ‘‘the difficulty of calculating costs and benefits
does not mean that we gain nothing from this approach… Understanding the
cost-benefit structure … should prove a useful exercise for decision makers
now and in the future’’ (Weeks, 2003). These issues can be handled by
treating some factors qualitatively, and by improving methods of quantification. The crucial point is to help and force the decision maker to recognize
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the full consequences; it is a cognitive more than a mathematical exercise
(Sunstein, 2000).
Indeed, the need for careful analysis of the risks, benefits and costs of
counterterrorism measures seems to be widely agreed. Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld worried to the 9/11 Commission that ‘‘the cost-benefit ratio’’
needs to favor the US but may not (National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States, 2004). Yoo (2004) has argued that military
self-defense (authorized under the UN Charter) needs to be understood in
cost-benefit terms, which implies that proposed preventive wars should be
carefully evaluated for their benefits, costs and risks. Weeks has argued
forcefully that the crucial challenge for future military success is not new
hardware technology but better decision making, informed by full analyses
of risks, benefits and costs; he calls for the regular application of economic
analysis to military decisions (Weeks, 2003). Mel Martinez, US Senator (RFlorida) and former cabinet secretary in the Bush administration,
commented on the pitfalls in US counterterror strategies: ‘‘At some point
you wonder about the cost-benefit ratio’’, he told The Economist (2005).
Senator Martinez is quite right, and the time to start ‘‘wondering’’, to
demand analysis of the benefits and costs, is before the key strategic
decisions are made, not only two or three years afterward.
To make such ex ante review effective, an expert body capable of
conducting serious analyses (and not beholden to the missions of the
agencies it is reviewing) needs to be charged by the president with the task of
policy review and the authority to check unwarranted policies and
encourage desirable policies. In the health and environmental regulatory
system, this function is played by the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) in the White House Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), which reviews Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) and has the
power to ‘‘return’’ proposed regulations whose RIAs are unsatisfactory. (A
similar system of RIAs is currently being adopted by the EU under its Better
Regulation initiative (Wiener, 2003; Lofstedt, 2004).) OIRA has performed
this function since President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12291,
requiring cost-benefit review of all new regulations, in 1981; but the
requirement to evaluate the benefits and costs of regulation has been a
bipartisan commitment of every president since the substantial expansion of
the regulatory state after 1970, including President Jimmy Carter’s Executive
Order 12044 requiring economic analysis of new regulations, and President
Clinton’s Executive Order 12866 in 1993 reconfirming the cost-benefit
review requirements of the Reagan order and indeed strengthening this
process. (The current Bush administration has retained Executive Order
12866, and OIRA continues to review regulations under its terms.) As noted
above, although some advocates of the Precautionary Principle see it as
opposed to regulatory impact analysis on cost-benefit criteria, others see the
two as potentially compatible once precaution is translated into appropriate
additional weights to be added when calculating the impacts of catastrophic
risks (Pearce, 2004; Europen Commission, 2004; Graham, 2001; Keeney
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and von Winterfeldt, 2001; Dekay et al., 2002; Stewart, 2002; Gollier and
Treich, 2003; Farrow, 2004; Posner, 2004).
Yet such analysis of counterterrorism measures does not appear to be
required or even typically practiced. There appears to be no Presidential
Executive Order or Decision Directive (at least none publicly available)
analogous to Executive Order 12866 or its predecessors requiring the
military and intelligence agencies to conduct such reviews. There seems to be
no institutionalized process of White House review, analogous to OIRA
review of regulations, for counterterrorism measures. ‘‘There is no evidence
that the President and those closest to him ever talked systematically about
the ‘opportunity costs’ and tradeoffs in their decision to invade Iraq’’, notes
Fallows (2004). There is the President’s Homeland Security Advisory
Council (PHSAC), created by Executive Order on March 19, 2002,4 which is
one institutional mechanism by which the president could get advice on
counterterrorism actions and their consequences; but it appears not to have
the expert analytic staff that OIRA does; and it is focused on domestic/
homeland policies, not foreign/military policies. The Defense Department
has had Instruction 7041.3 (Nov. 7, 1995) calling for ‘‘Economic Analysis
for Decision Making’’ and establishing a Defense Economic Analysis
Council, but those analyses are limited to procurement and other federal
expenditure decisions and do not appear to apply to counterterrorism
actions such as military interventions. The crucial role of systematic,
institutionalized application of risk analysis—to help and force decisionmakers to consider the full consequences of their actions and to adjust policy
choices accordingly (Sunstein, 2000; Wiener, 1998)—is not being served.
This situation is odd because the US military has a history of using
economic analysis. Indeed it was the US military that brought concepts of
systems analysis into government and helped them spread to other agencies.
‘‘When [Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara assumed responsibility, he
initiated the ‘dispassionate’ studies’’ for decision-making, whereas previously decisions had been made by more ‘‘intuitive’’ selection, writes
Donald Smalter. ‘‘This was accomplished through a detailed analysis of
alternatives by a section called the Systems Analysis group’’ (Smalter, 1964).
McNamara created the high level office of Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Systems Analysis (later the office of Program Analysis); the office was
charged with making ‘‘cost-effectiveness studies of major strategic and
weapons systems alternatives’’ (Smalter, 1964). McNamara’s quantitative
approach was exported to other sectors: ‘‘In 1961 the Defense Department,
under a new Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, began a major
management revolution… In August, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson
announced his plans to develop comparable management systems in other
executive departments’’, noted Paul Hammond in 1968. Outside experts
such as Albert Wohlstetter at RAND, Herman Kahn at the Hudson Institute
4

See ,www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020321-9.html..
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and Thomas Schelling at Harvard were urging the defense agencies to take a
decision analytic approach to thinking through military strategy and
scenarios (often based on qualitative judgment rather than only quantified
calculations). There is also an extensive literature on Operations Research in
the military, collected in the text by N. K. Jaiswal (1997). He notes that
military operations research dates back to World War II but was often kept
classified (Jaiswal, 1997). It is plausible that the advent of economic analysis
of health and environmental regulations in the Nixon, Carter and Reagan
administrations grew out of or built upon the use of these same methods in
the Defense Department and related agencies. Now the national security
system can and should borrow back these methods for application to
counterterrorism.
As the US undertakes a long war on terrorism, and especially as it
employs precautionary strategies such as preventive war, the US government
needs to adopt a much more systematic, institutionalized approach to ex
ante and ex post review of counterterrorism measures. It needs to establish
some form of rigorous White House oversight that will go beyond a narrow
focus on the target risk of immediate concern to a proponent agency, toward
a full portfolio analysis of target risk reduction benefits, costs, ancillary
benefits and countervailing risks. Similarly, the UN Security Council needs
such an institutional mechanism for its own decisions on preventive war,
implementing the criteria set for the by the UN High-Level Panel (Annan,
2004)—in particular, balancing the consequences of intervention.
The particular institutional home for such review in the US government
could be the National Security Council (NSC), which already oversees the
Defense and Intelligence agencies. At its best, the NSC helps the president
think through problems and options, and highlights scenarios that include
both intended and unintended consequences (Rothkopf, 2005). It could also
be the President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council (PHSAC) noted
above. Or it could be OMB/OIRA, which already reviews RIAs for
Homeland Security regulations, but which may lack expertise on military
strategy choices. Or the newly created Director of National Intelligence
could undertake this task. To combine expertise, the NSC, PHSAC and
OMB/OIRA could form a joint task group to set criteria for national security
risk analyses and to review such analyses accompanying proposed actions
submitted by agencies. The Defense Economic Analysis Council could be
expanded and empowered to perform this role, at least for the Defense
Department. Counterpart offices could play this role in other national
governments. At the UN Security Council, a special expert staff could be
created to undertake risk analyses.
Such reviews need not all be made public, though transparency would be
a helpful tonic to sensible analysis. Nor need they be subject to judicial
review, just as OIRA reviews are not.
A caveat to the foregoing: it may be that such analytic review of
precautionary counterterrorism measures, including military actions, is
already conducted, but that it remains classified and invisible to the public.
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This prospect seems doubtful given the lack of any such analysis reported by
the 9/11 Commission, the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities
Regarding WMD and other investigative panels that had access to classified
documents. But if it does occur, then our suggestion is that it needs to be
more searching and systematic to take account of the array of costs and
countervailing risks identified above. Also, some greater degree of public
transparency would both encourage greater rigor in the analyses and build
public confidence in the decisions based on such analysis.
A second caveat: we make no claim that the results of such analysis
should strictly dictate decisions. Systematic analysis should be a tool for
improved decision-making, not a rigid constraint. Sometimes decisive action
will have to be taken very quickly, in which case the analysis may have to be
truncated; but inculcating the cognitive framework of full portfolio
consequences analysis can still helpfully inform the rapid decision.
Particularly in dealing with adversaries who behave strategically, an initial
analysis of consequences cannot bind the government, because such a rule
would in turn embolden a rogue state or terrorist actor to exploit the
analysis by attacking. This would raise the probability of attack above the
analysts’ forecast and in effect engage in purposive moral hazard. An
insightful analysis would account for just this kind of strategic response; it
would envision scenarios in which the analysis itself influences the
adversary. The key point is that counterterrorism decisions will be improved
by thinking through the consequences.
Conclusion
Events are still unfolding, so we must wait to evaluate the ultimate ex post
consequences of present counterterrorism policies. It will take years to tell
whether the war in Iraq will actually reduce or increase the risk of terrorist
attacks on the US, or have other impacts. The absence of a clear
counterfactual scenario (what would have happened otherwise) may make
it very difficult to say. When asked to appraise the French Revolution, Choe
En Lai is said to have answered ‘‘it’s too soon to tell’’. Full portfolio analyses
of the consequences of counterterrorism measures should not wait
indefinitely, nor should they be neglected, nor should they constitute a
one-time exercise. Repeated analysis of consequences, before, during and
after a policy is implemented, will be essential to deciding, learning,
updating and adaptive improvement. Of course, such analyses must compare
alternative options for reducing the risk of terrorism, including precaution
(preventive war), civil defense (target hardening and decentralization),
undermining terrorist groups by impeding financing and recruitment
(including via competing carrots), and other alternatives (Frey, 2004).5
5

Frey concludes that military intervention and deterrence are likely to be less effective at
reducing the risk of future terrorist attacks than are alternative strategies such as
decentralizing targets and recruiting potential terrorists to other pursuits.
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Here we have only proposed an analytic framework and institutional
mechanism for making such comparative evaluations in the future.
The risk of terrorist attacks is sufficiently serious (even if low
probability) that it may warrant precaution. But precautionary measures
may turn out to increase, rather than decrease, the risk, such as by fostering
blow-back, increased recruitment of terrorists, theft of WMD, displacement
to softer targets and impairment of US military capabilities. Risk-superior
solutions are urgently needed to reduce these multiple risks in concert.
Unintended consequences are not always unforeseeable. Precaution
driven by overstated risk assessments and fear of dreaded risks will not yield
sound policies. Sensible ex ante analysis can identify foreseeable but
unintended consequences. Many of the new risks introduced by the war were
foreseeable, at least as plausible scenarios. It was foreseeable that WMD
might be dispersed rather than destroyed. It was foreseeable that the attack
and occupation would be perceived as humiliating to Muslims, rather than
as liberating, and that the campaign would benefit Al Qaeda and expand its
ranks. It was foreseeable that the risk posed by Hussein would be reduced,
but also that it would be transformed into a new risk posed by non-state
actors, or by other rogue states now arming themselves. It was foreseeable
that allowing interrogators to apply forms of coercive pressure could lead to
disclosures of humiliating tactics that would only accelerate terrorists’
recruiting. It was foreseeable that additional new risks could be introduced
by setting a precedent for unilateral preventive war without Security Council
approval.
Yet there does not seem to have been a systematic analysis of these
benefits, costs and risks before the decision to engage in preventive war.
More generally, there does not appear to be an institutional process for ex
ante or ex post review of the expected consequences of proposed counterterrorism measures. Such a process should be established in each government
or intergovernmental body taking important counterterrorism decisions. The
shift to precaution in the US National Security Strategy, and in the US and
UK invasion of Iraq, coupled with the crucial imperative to succeed in the
war on terrorism by actually reducing overall risk, makes such analysis
urgent and indispensable. The point here is not that the war in Iraq was a
clear mistake—though, viewed ex post, it appears to have yielded a minimal
reduction in target risk, unclear ancillary benefits, significant costs and
significant countervailing risks (including military and civilian lives lost,
increased terrorist recruiting, neglect of other risks of WMD and other rogue
states, impaired US military capabilities, and potential loss of WMD from
Iraq). The point here is larger: that counterterrorism, and especially
precautionary counterterrorism, should draw valuable insights from risk
analysis and, like other risk management interventions, should be preceded
by (and later appraised using) a serious, systematic analysis of the full
portfolio of expected impacts. This process should be established in
appropriate institutional mechanisms.
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Full portfolio risk analysis can be a powerful counterweight to missiondriven agencies, passion for precaution, neglect of unintended consequences
and ‘‘groupthink’’. Benjamin Franklin advised a careful weighing of the pros
and cons before making an important decision. He counseled that decisions
tend to err ‘‘chiefly because while we have them under Consideration, all the
Reasons pro and con are not present to the Mind at the same time … yet,
when each is thus considered, separately and comparatively, and the whole
lies before me, I think I can judge better, and am less liable to make a rash
Step’’ (Franklin, 1772 [1936]). Adam Smith wrote that ‘‘science is the great
antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition’’ (Smith, 1776), by
which he meant that reasoned analysis overcomes ideology and zeal. Barbara
Tuchman argued that the primary cause of military folly is the neglect of
reason (Tuchman, 1984). Systematic analysis of the consequences of
national security strategy can be the antidote to passionate haste and
counterproductive folly. There is no patriotic glory in senseless pursuit of
self-defeating strategies. Self-defense is not aided by firing hastily at the
wrong targets. In the war on terrorism, it is the height of patriotism to insist
that, before it acts, the government think things through.
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